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Abstract
Existing approaches to tolerate Byzantine faults in geo-repli-
cated environments require systems to execute complex
agreement protocols over wide-area links and consequently
are often associated with high response times. In this paper
we address this problem with Spider, a resilient replica-
tion architecture for geo-distributed systems that leverages
the availability characteristics of today’s public-cloud in-
frastructures to minimize complexity and reduce latency.
Spider models a system as a collection of loosely coupled
replica groups whose members are hosted in different cloud-
provided fault domains (i.e., availability zones) of the same
geographic region. This structural organization makes it
possible to achieve low response times by placing replica
groups in close proximity to clients while still enabling the
replicas of a group to interact over short-distance links. To
handle the inter-group communication necessary for strong
consistency Spider uses a reliable group-to-group message
channel with first-in-first-out semantics and built-in flow
control that significantly simplifies system design.
CCSConcepts: •Computer systems organization→De-
pendable and fault-tolerant systems and networks.
Keywords: Byzantine fault tolerance, geo-replication
1 Introduction
Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols enable a system to
withstand arbitrary faults and consequently have been used
to increase the resilience of a wide spectrum of critical appli-
cations such as key-value stores [24, 35, 44, 45], SCADA sys-
tems [9, 10, 43], firewalls [16, 27], coordination services [11,
19, 21, 26, 32], and permissioned blockchains [29, 50]. To pro-
vide their high degree of fault tolerance, BFT protocols repli-
cate the state of an application across a set of servers and rely
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on a leader-based consensus algorithm to keep these replicas
consistent. This task requires several subprotocols (e.g., for
leader election, checkpointing, state transfer) and multiple
phases of message exchange between replicas [18].
Unfortunately, this complexity makes it inherently diffi-
cult to achieve low latency in use cases in which the clients
of an application are scattered across various geographic
locations. For example, placing replicas in close proximity
to each other may reduce the latency of strongly consistent
requests whose executionmust be coordinated by the consen-
sus protocol between replicas. However, with replicas being
located farther apart from clients this strategy also increases
the response times of requests such as weakly consistent
reads that do not need to be agreed on and only involve
direct interaction between clients and replicas. In contrast,
co-locating replicas with clients has the inverse effect of
speeding up client–replica communication but adding a sig-
nificant performance overhead to the agreement protocol.
Existing approaches for BFT wide-area replication aim at
minimizing this overhead by (1) applying weighted-voting
schemes to reduce the quorum sizes needed to complete con-
sensus [12, 49], (2) rotating the leader role among replicas to
shorten the path necessary to insert a request into the agree-
ment protocol [38, 53, 54], or (3) relying on a two-level sys-
tem design that deploys an entire BFT replica cluster at each
client site in order to be able to use crash-tolerant replication
between sites [4, 6]. In all these cases, BFT systems still need
to run complex consensus-based replication protocols over
wide-area links which not only results in response-time over-
head but also makes it difficult to dynamically introduce new
replica sites, for example, to serve clients at new locations.
In this paper we address these problems with Spider, a
cloud-based BFT system architecture for geo-replicated ser-
vices that models a system as a collection of loosely coupled
replica groups that are deployed in different regions. Sep-
arating agreement from execution [55], one of the groups
(“agreement group”) establishes an order on all requests with
strong consistency demands while all other groups (“execu-
tion groups”) are responsible for communicating with clients
and processing requests. In contrast to existing approaches,
Spider does not require complex wide-area protocols but
instead handles tasks such as consensus, leader election, and
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checkpointing within a group and over short-distance links.
To make this possible while still offering resilience against
replica failures, Spider leverages the design of today’s cloud
infrastructures [2, 28, 40] and places the replicas of a group
in different availability zones of the same region; availabil-
ity zones are hosted by data centers at distinct sites and
specifically engineered to represent different fault domains.
In particular we make four contributions in this paper:
(1) We present the Spider architecture and discuss how it
achieves low latency for weakly consistent reads by placing
execution groups close to clients, while at the same time
minimizing agreement response times for strongly consis-
tent reads and writes. (2) We show how to design Spider in a
modular way so that execution groups do not depend on in-
ternals of the agreement group (e.g., a specific consensus pro-
tocol). As an additional benefit, the modularity also makes it
straightforward to add/remove execution groups at runtime.
(3) We introduce a wide-area BFT flow-control mechanism
that exploits the special characteristics of Spider to mini-
mize complexity. Our approach is based on a simple message-
channel abstraction that handles the inter-regional commu-
nication between two replica groups and prevents one group
from overwhelming the other. (4) We evaluate Spider in com-
parison to the state of the art in BFT wide-area replication.
2 Background and Problem Statement
In this section, we present background on existing approaches
and common requirements of BFT wide-area replication.
2.1 System Model
Our work focuses on stateful applications with strong relia-
bility requirements whose clients are scattered across differ-
ent geographic locations. To access the application a client
submits a request to the server side. We assume that both
clients and servers can be subject to Byzantine faults. As a
consequence, nodes (i.e., clients and servers) do not trust each
other and do not make irreversible decisions based on the in-
put provided by another node alone. For example, to tolerate
up to f faulty servers, a client only accepts a result after it has
obtained at least f +1matching replies from different servers.
Besides service availability and correctness in the presence
of failures, low latency is a primary concern in our target sys-
tems. Achieving this goal while keeping the states of servers
consistent is inherently difficult in use cases in which clients
are geographically dispersed. The problem is further com-
plicated by the fact that we assume that the locations from
which clients access the application may change over time,
typically as a result of the global day/night cycle. To con-
tinuously provide low latency under such conditions, a sys-
tem must offer some kind of reconfiguration mechanism en-
abling an adaptation to varying workloads. One possibility to
achieve this, for example, is to dynamically include additional
servers that are located closer to newly started clients.
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Figure 1. System architectures for BFT geo-replication con-
necting a client (C) with leader (L) and follower (F) replicas.
2.2 Existing Approaches
In the following, we elaborate on the problems associated
with Byzantine fault tolerance in geo-distributed systems
and discuss existing approaches to solve them.
BFT in Wide-Area Environments. The straightforward
approach to offer resilience against arbitrary failures is to
rely on a BFT replication protocol, for example PBFT [18]. As
illustrated in Figure 1a, PBFT requires at least 3f + 1 replicas
to tolerate f failures. To keep the application state consis-
tent across replicas, PBFT ensures that replicas run an agree-
ment protocol to decide in which order to process client
requests. For this purpose, PBFT elects one of the replicas
as leader (marked L in Figure 1a) while all other replicas
assume the roles of followers (F ). Having received a new
request, the leader is responsible for initiating the agreement
process, which then involves multiple message exchanges be-
tween replicas. To deal with scenarios where a faulty leader
does not behave according to specification, for example by
ignoring a request, PBFT provides a mechanism that enables
followers to depose the leader and appoint a new one. Once
the agreement process is complete, all non-faulty replicas
execute the request and send the result to the client, thereby
enabling the client to validate the result by comparison.
Using BFT protocols such as PBFT to build resilient sys-
tems is effective but has several disadvantages in the context
of geo-replication: (1) With replicas being distributed across
different geographic sites, the entire BFT protocol needs to
be executed over wide-area links, which often results in high
response times. Note that this is not only true with regard to
the task of agreeing on requests during normal operation, but
for example also for electing a new leader as part of fault han-
dling. (2) Due to the fact that all requests must flow through
the leader, the geographic location of the leader, and in partic-
ular its position relative to the majority of followers, usually
has a significant influence on latency [25, 49]. Consequently,
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a leader switch may decisively change a system’s perfor-
mance characteristics, requiring clients to deal with the as-
sociated latency volatility. (3) Consisting of only 3f + 1 repli-
cas, for traditional BFT systems it is inherently difficult to
select suitable replica locations in cases where a large and
varying number of clients are scattered across the globe. Ide-
ally, replicas would be placed both in close distance to each
other (to speed up agreement) as well as in close distance
to clients (to minimize the transmission time of requests
and results). For systems with just a few replicas but many
clients meeting this requirement is essentially impossible.
Weighted Voting. By assigning different weights on the
votes replica have within the consensus protocol [12, 49]
it is feasible to introduce additional replicas while keeping
response times low or even reducing them in a geo-replicated
setting. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of an increased
number of messages exchanged between replicas, which
can be prohibitively expensive in public-cloud settings as
providers typically charge extra for wide-area traffic.
Leader Rotation. Different authors have proposed to im-
prove performance by rotating the leader role among repli-
cas, following the idea of enabling each client to submit
requests to its nearest replica [38, 53, 54]. Results from an
extensive experimental evaluation by Sousa et al. [49], how-
ever, showed that in practice this approach does not provide
significant benefits compared with appointing a fixed leader
at a well-connected site. Besides, leader rotation still requires
the execution of a complex protocol over wide-area links.
Hierarchical System Architecture. To increase the scala-
bility of BFT systems in wide-area settings, Amir et al. pre-
sented a hierarchical architecture as part of their Steward
system [6]. As shown in Figure 1b, instead of hosting a single
replica, each site in Steward comprises a cluster of replicas
that run a site-local BFT agreement protocol. A key benefit
of this approach is the fact that, although individual replicas
still may be subject to Byzantine faults, an entire cluster can
be assumed to only fail by crashing. This property at the local
level enables Steward to rely on a crash-tolerant agreement
protocol at the global level (i.e., between sites), which com-
pared with traditional BFT systems requires fewer phases
and fewer message transmissions over wide-area links.
The efficiency enhancements made possible by its archi-
tecture enable Steward to improve performance, however,
they come at the cost of an increased overall complexity
that stems from the need to maintain replication protocols at
two levels: within each site as well as between sites. Design-
ing and implementing such protocols in isolation already
is a non-trivial task, additionally guaranteeing a correct in-
terplay between them is even more challenging. To ensure
liveness Steward, for example, requires timeouts at different
levels to be carefully coordinated [6]. Amir et al. addressed
these problems in a subsequent work [4], which in this paper
we refer to as CFT-WAR. In contrast to Steward, in CFT-WAR
each step of the wide-area protocol (e.g., Paxos [33]) is han-
dled by a full-fledged multi-phase consensus protocol at each
site (e.g., PBFT). As amain advantage, this approach disentan-
gles the protocols used for wide-area and site-internal replica-
tion. On the downside, it introduces additional overhead that
in general prevents CFT-WAR from achieving response times
as low as Steward’s when providing the same degree of fault
tolerance [4]. Furthermore, due to performing agreement at
two levels CFT-WAR still needs to run multiple subprotocols
for tasks such as leader election, one at each level. A set of
additional subprotocols would be required to support the dy-
namic addition/removal of individual replicas or entire sites
in a hierarchical system architecture, thereby further increas-
ing complexity. To our knowledge, the ability to adjust to
varying workload conditions was not a design goal of Stew-
ard and CFT-WAR, which is why the systems do not offer
mechanisms for changing their composition at runtime.
2.3 Problem Statement
Our analysis in Section 2.2 shows that applying existing ap-
proaches to provide BFT in a cloud-based geo-replicated en-
vironment is possible, for example with regard to safety, but
cumbersome due to the associated high complexity and the
lack of effective means to react to changing workloads. This
observation led us to ask whether these problems can be cir-
cumvented by a BFT system architecture that is specifically
tailored to the characteristics of today’s cloud infrastructures.
In particular, we aim for a resilient system architecture that
has three properties: efficiency, modularity, and adaptability.
Efficiency. To minimize response times during both normal-
case operation aswell as fault handling, a system architecture
in the ideal case does not require the execution of complex
protocols over wide-area links. Instead, tasks involving mul-
tiple phases of message exchange between replicas, such as
the agreement on requests, should be handled by replicas
that are located in comparably close distance to each other.
Modularity. Supporting a variety of cloud use cases with
different requirements is difficult if the protocols responsible
for the agreement and execution of requests are hard-wired
into the BFT system architecture. To address this issue, we
join other authors [4] in aiming for an architecture that, for
example, can be integrated with different consensus proto-
cols depending on the specific demands of an application.
Adaptability. One major strength of public clouds is to
quickly provide resources on demand and at various geo-
graphic locations all over the globe. A BFT system archi-
tecture should be able to leverage this feature for hosting
replicas in the proximity of clients to reduce the latency with
which clients access the replicated service. Specifically, if new
clients are started at other sites, there should be a lightweight
mechanism for dynamically adding new replicas. The same
applies to means for removing replicas that are no longer of
benefit as the clients in their vicinity have been shut down.
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3 Spider
This section presents the cloud-based BFT system architec-
ture Spider. In particular, we focus on how the architecture
achieves low latency by performing consensus only over
short-distance links, how Spider achieves modularity by re-
lying on a novel message-channel abstraction, and how it can
be dynamically reconfigured to adapt to workload changes.
3.1 Architecture
Targeting use cases in wide-area environments, Spider’s sys-
tem architecture is distributed across multiple geographic
sites. For this purpose, Spider leverages the common or-
ganizational structure of state-of-the-art cloud infrastruc-
tures such as Amazon EC2 [2], Microsoft Azure [40], or
Google Compute Engine [28] by grouping sites into regions,
as shown in Figure 2. The sites within a region typically
are several tens of kilometers apart from each other and
represent separate fault domains, commonly referred to as
availability zones. In addition to constructing the data cen-
ters at distinct geographic locations, cloud providers also
ensure that data centers in different availability zones are
equipped with dedicated power supply systems and network
links to minimize the probability of dependent failures. For
the Spider system architecture, availability zones play an
important role as they allow us to place replicas in separate
fault domains and still enable them to interact over short-
distance links with comparably low latency.
Replica Groups. Relying on this setting, Spider is com-
posed of multiple loosely coupled replica groups, each being
distributed across different availability zones of a specific re-
gion. One of the replica groups in the system, the agreement
group, is responsible for establishing a global total order on
incoming requests. The size of this group depends on the
protocol it uses for consensus. Running PBFT [18], for exam-
ple, the agreement group consists of 3fa + 1 replicas and is
able to tolerate fa Byzantine faults. All other replica groups
in the system, the execution groups, host the application logic,
process the ordered requests, and handle the communication
with clients. Each of these groups comprises 2fe + 1 repli-
cas and tolerates at most fe Byzantine faults. The level of
fault tolerance provided by the agreement group and the ex-
ecutions groups may be selected independently. Supporting
multiple execution groups enables Spider to scale through-
put by adding/removing groups and to minimize latency by
placing groups in the vicinity of clients.
Execution-ReplicaRegistry. Spider contains an execution-
replica registry to provide clients with information on the
locations and addresses of active replicas. The registry is a
BFT service that is hosted and maintained by the agreement
group. Its contents are updated by agreement replicas when-
ever the composition of the system changes (see Section 3.6).
Efficient BFTReplication. In contrast to existing approach-
es (see Section 2.2), Spider does not run a full-fledged and
Agreement
group
Execution
groups
Clients
Channels
Region
Availability zones
Figure 2. Spider system architecture
complex replication protocol over long-distance links. In-
stead, all non-trivial tasks (e.g., reaching consensus on re-
quests) are carried out within a replica group using low-
latency intra-region connections. Following this design prin-
ciple, Spider handles requests by forwarding them along
a chain of stages represented by different replica groups.
Specifically, clients submit their requests to their nearest
execution group, which in turn forwards the request to the
agreement group for ordering. Once this step is complete,
the agreement group instructs all execution groups to pro-
cess the ordered request. This ensures that execution-group
states remain consistent without requiring the execution
groups to reach consensus themselves. Having processed
the request, the replicas of the execution group the client
is connected to return the result. As each execution group
comprises 2fe + 1 replicas, clients are able to verify the cor-
rectness of a result solely based on the replies they receive
from their local execution group.
With all communication-intensive steps being performed
over intra-region links, inter-region links in Spider are only
responsible for forwarding the outputs of one stage to the
replica group(s) constituting the next stage. In particular, this
approach has the following benefits: (1) It greatly simplifies
the interaction of replicas over long-distance connections.
(2) It enables a modular design that allows different deploy-
ments to rely on different agreement protocols without the
need to modify the implementation of execution replicas.
(3) As we show in Section 3.2, it allows Spider to use the
same abstraction, a reliable message channel, for all inter-
region links, thereby facilitating system implementation.
Practical Considerations. As of this writing, all major
public clouds offer several regions with at least three avail-
ability zones (Amazon EC2: 20, Microsoft Azure: 10, Google
Compute Engine: 24) and therefore support the world-wide
deployment of Spider execution groups which tolerate one
faulty replica. In addition, Amazon (Virginia, Oregon, Tokyo)
and Google (Iowa) also already operate regions with four
or more availability zones, which consequently are candi-
dates for hosting Spider’s agreement group. With public
cloud infrastructures still being expanded, new regions and
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availability zones are added every year, increasing the de-
ployment options for Spider. Besides, to further improve the
resilience of Spider, agreement and execution replicas may
be distributed across different clouds, thereby reducing the
dependence on a single provider [1, 14]. As there are several
regions hosting data centers and availability zones of multi-
ple providers (e.g., Europe, North America, South America,
India, Asia, and Australia), this approach also makes it pos-
sible to deploy larger agreement and execution groups that
tolerate fa > 1 and fe > 1 replica failures, respectively.
Representing distinct fault and upgrade domains, avail-
ability zones are designed to enable uninterrupted execution
of services that are replicated within the same region. De-
spite the efforts undertaken by providers, in the past there
have been rare incidents where problems in one availabil-
ity zone caused temporary availability issues in other zones
belonging to the same region [3]. In Spider, if more than
fa agreement replicas are unresponsive, the agreement group
temporarily cannot order new requests until the replicas be-
come available again. However, as we detail in Section 3.3,
in such cases Spider is still able to process weakly consis-
tent read requests as these operations are handled within a
client’s local execution group. On the other hand, if more
than fe replicas of the same execution group become unavail-
able, affected clients can temporarily switch to a different
execution group and continue to use the service.
3.2 Inter-Regional Message Channels
To support a modular design, we use an abstraction to han-
dle all interaction between replica groups in Spider: the
inter-regional message channel (IRMC). Specifically, IRMCs
are responsible for forwarding messages from a group of
sender replicas in one region to a group of receiver replicas
in another region. Conceptually, IRMCs can be viewed as
an extension of BLinks [4], however, unlike BLinks, IRMCs
(1) do not require messages to be totally ordered at the chan-
nel level and (2) comprise built-in flow control. To forward
information, an IRMC internally can be divided into multiple
subchannels providing first-in-first-out semantics. Each sub-
channel has a configurable maximum capacity (i.e., an upper
bound on the number of messages that can be concurrently
in transmission) and relies on a window-based flow-control
mechanism to prevent senders from overwhelming receivers.
Below, we discuss the specifics of IRMCs at a conceptual
level. For possible implementations please refer to Section 4.
Overview. Figure 3 presents an example IRMC that com-
prises two subchannels and connects four senders to three
receivers. Subchannels of the same IRMC are independent
of each other and can be regarded as distributed queues
with limited capacity that distinguish messages based on
unique position indices. Both senders and receivers run ded-
icated endpoints which together form the IRMC and enable
the replicas to access it. When a replica sends a message,
Sender Endpoint Interface
void send(Subchannel sc, Position p, Message m);
void move_window(Subchannel sc, Position p);
Receiver Endpoint Interface
Message receive(Subchannel sc, Position p);
void move_window(Subchannel sc, Position p);
Channel
MMMMM M M
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
MMMMM
Subchannel B
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
Senders
Endpoint S1
Endpoint S2
Endpoint S3
Endpoint S4
[10, 14] [90, 94]
[15, 19] [90, 94]
[15, 19] [90, 94]
[15, 19] [87, 91]
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Endpoint R1
Endpoint R2
Endpoint R3
[15, 19] [90, 94]
[15, 19] [90, 94]
[13, 17] [90, 94]
Flow-control windows for Subchannels A and B
Figure 3. Conceptual view of an example IRMC with two in-
dependent subchannels that both have a maximum capacity
of ten messages (M). Senders (S∗) and receivers (R∗) access
the subchannels via their local endpoints; each endpoint
manages its own subchannel-specific flow-control windows.
it provides its local endpoint with the information which
subchannel and position to use for the message (send()).
Similarly, to receive a message a replica queries its local end-
point for the message corresponding to a specific subchannel
and position (receive()). In addition, IRMC endpoints offer
a method to shift the flow-control window of a subchan-
nel (move_window()), as further discussed below.
Send Semantics. IRMCs are not designed to exchange arbi-
trary messages between replicas but instead provide specific
send semantics enabling Spider to safely forward the deci-
sion of a replica group to another. In particular, tolerating
at most fs senders with Byzantine faults, the IRMC only
forwards a message after at least fs + 1 different senders
transmitted a message with identical content using the same
subchannel and position. Consequently, in order for a mes-
sage to pass the channel at least one correct sender must
have vouched for the validity of the message’s content and
requested its transmission. In contrast, messages solely sub-
mitted by the up to fs faulty senders have no possibility of
getting through and being delivered to receivers.
Authentication. IRMCs protect all channel-internal com-
munication with digital signatures to enable the recipient
of a message to verify the integrity and the origin of the
message. If an endpoint is unable to validate the authenticity
of a received message, it immediately discards the message.
Flow Control. With the capacities of subchannels being
limited, IRMC endpoints apply a flow-control mechanism
to coordinate senders and receivers. For this purpose, for
each subchannel an endpoint manages a separate window
that restricts which messages a sender/receiver is able to
transmit/obtain at a given time. If a subchannel’s window at
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a sender endpoint is full, the sender cannot insert additional
messages into this subchannel until the endpoint moves the
window forward. In the normal case, this action is triggered
by receivers calling move_window() and requesting the start
of the window to be shifted to a higher position. Whenever a
sender endpoint learns that thewindow position has changed
at one of the receiver endpoints, the sender endpoint sets its
own window start to the fr + 1 highest position requested
by any receiver where fr denotes the number of receivers
with Byzantine faults to tolerate. This ensures that correct
sender endpoints only move their windows, and thus discard
messages at lower positions, after receiving the information
that at least one correct receiver has permitted such a step.
Besides receiver-driven window shifts, our channels also
allow senders to request an increase of the starting posi-
tion of a subchannel’s window. If senders opt to do so, it
may become impossible for a receiver endpoint to provide
the message at the position the endpoint’s local replica re-
quested. The same scenario can occur if a receiver endpoint
is slow or falls behind (e.g., due to a network problem) while
fr + 1 other receivers have already requested the window
to be moved forward. In such cases, the affected receiver
endpoint aborts the receive() call with an exception and
thereby enables its local replica to handle the situation. As
discussed in Section 3.4, replicas react to such an exception
by obtaining the missed information from other replicas.
Use in Spider. IRMCs are an essential building block of Spi-
der’s modular architecture as they enable us to design a geo-
replicated BFT system as a composition of loosely coupled
replica groups that interact using the same channel abstrac-
tion. In particular, Spider relies on two different IRMC in-
stances to perform all inter-group communication over long-
distance links: the request channel and the commit channel.
The request channel allows an execution group to forward
newly received requests to the agreement group; that is, this
channel is an IRMC that connects 2fe + 1 senders (i.e., execu-
tion replicas) to 3fa+1 receivers (i.e., agreement replicas). To
transmit the requests, the request channel comprises multi-
ple subchannels, one for each client. In contrast, the commit
channel only consists of a single subchannel and is used by
the agreement group to inform an execution group about
the totally ordered sequence of agreed requests. The commit
channel consequently is responsible for forwarding the deci-
sions of 3fa + 1 senders to 2fe + 1 receivers. In summary, the
agreement group maintains a pair of IRMCs (i.e., one request
channel and one commit channel) to each execution group.
3.3 Request Handling
Spider differentiates between requests that potentially mod-
ify application state (“writes”) and those that do not (“reads”).
This distinction enables the system to handle requests of each
category as efficiently as possible. While writes need to be
applied to all execution groups to keep their states consistent,
Preprocessing Execution
ExecutionAgreement
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A
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channel
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channel
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Figure 4. Overview of Spider’s replication protocol
it is sufficient for reads to only process them at the execution
group a client is connected to. Figure 4 gives an overview of
how requests flow through Spider. Below, we provide details
on the system’s replication protocols for writes and reads.
In this context, it is important to note that all messages ex-
changed between clients and replicas must be authenticated,
for example using HMACs [52]. For messages sent through
IRMCs, the authentication is handled by the channels.
In the following, we describe Spider’s handling of write
and read requests . The proof of correctness and liveness is
deferred to the appendix of the paper.
Writes. Spider’s protocol for writes is presented in Fig-
ure 5. To perform a write operation w , a client c creates
a corresponding message ⟨Write,w, c, tc ⟩ using a unique
client-local counter value tc and sends the message to all
replicas of an execution group. In general, a client for this
purpose may select any execution group in the system, how-
ever, in an effort to minimize latency, Spider clients typically
choose the group closest to their own site.
When an execution replica receives the client’s request, it
first checks whether the message is correctly authenticated
and whether the client has permission to access the system.
If any of these checks fail the replica discards the message.
Otherwise, the replica of execution group e wraps the entire
request r in a message ⟨Reqest, r , e⟩ and submits the mes-
sage to the agreement group via its request channel. More
precisely, unless the execution replica has already forwarded
the request (Lines 5–6) it moves the window of the client’s
subchannel to position tc and inserts the write request at
that position (L. 7–8). Once at least fe +1members of the exe-
cution group (i.e., at least one correct execution replica) have
validated and forwarded the request, the request channel per-
mits agreement replicas to retrieve the message (L. 30). This
allows the agreement group to initiate the consensus process
for the message (L. 33), which is then performed entirely
within the group’s region. Having learned that the request is
committed and has been assigned the agreement-sequence
number s (L. 35), an agreement replica creates a confirmation
⟨Execute, r , s⟩. As write operations need to be processed by
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all execution groups, the agreement replica sends this mes-
sage through all commit channels at position s (L. 40).
Once fa + 1 agreement replicas (among them at least one
correct replica) have sent an Executemessage with the same
content and sequence number, a commit channel enables its
receivers to obtain the message (L. 26). Having done so, an
execution replica processes the included request by applying
the corresponding write to its local state (L. 14). Each replica
of execution group e also returns a reply ⟨Result,uc , tc ⟩
with the operation’s result uc to the client that submitted
the request with counter value tc (L. 16). The client accepts a
result after it has received fe +1 replies with matching result
and counter value from different execution replicas.
Aswe detail in Section 3.4, when processingwrites replicas
in Spider also create periodic checkpoints (L. 17–21 and 41–
51) to assist other replicas that might have fallen behind.
Reads. For reads, Spider offers two different operations
providing weakly consistent and strongly consistent results,
respectively. To perform a weakly consistent read, a client
sends a read request to all members of an execution group,
which for a valid request immediately responds with a result,
as illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 4. As for writes,
a client verifies the result based on fe + 1 matching replies.
Weakly consistent reads achieve low latency as they only
involve communication between the client and its execution
group. Due to these reads being processed without further co-
ordination with writes, in the presence of concurrent writes
to the same state parts they may return stale values or fewer
than fe +1matching results, similar to the optimized reads in
existing BFT protocols [18, 49]. Spider clients react to stalled
reads by retrying the operation or performing a strongly con-
sistent read, which is guaranteed to produce a stable result.
Strongly consistent reads in Spider for the most part have
the same control and data flow as writes, with one important
exception. With reads not modifying the application state, it
is sufficient to process them at the client’s execution group.
Consequently, after a read request completed the consensus
process, agreement replicas only forward it to the execution
group that needs to handle the request. The Executes to all
other groups instead contain a placeholder including only the
client request counter value for the same sequence number,
thereby minimizing network and execution overhead.
3.4 Checkpointing
As discussed in Section 3.2, an IRMC may garbage-collect
messages before they have been delivered to all correct re-
ceivers. In the normal case in which all receivers advance at
similar speed, this property usually does not take effect, re-
sulting in each receiver to obtain every message. To address
exceptional cases in which a correct receiver misses mes-
sages (e.g. due to a network problem), Spider provides means
to bring the affected receiver up to date via a checkpoint.
The specific contents of a checkpoint vary depending on the
Execution Replica of Execution Group e
1 sn := 0 // Current sequence number
2 t [c] := 0 //Vector with counter value of latest forwarded client request
3 u[c] :=  // Reply cache ⟨Reply, uc , tc ⟩
4 on receive(r = ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩ from c):
5 if tc ≤ t [c]: return send result u[c] to c
6 t [c] := tc // Remember forwarded request
7 request−IRMC.move_window(c, tc)
8 request−IRMC.send(c, tc, ⟨Reqest, r, e ⟩)
9 main loop:
10 m := commit−IRMC.receive(0, sn + 1)
11 if m = ⟨TooOld, s′⟩: fetch checkpoint for s′
12 else:
13 m = ⟨Execute, ⟨Reqest, ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩, e′⟩, sn + 1⟩
14 uc := Application execute m
15 sn := sn + 1
16 send ⟨Result, uc , tc ⟩ to c if e′ = e and store in u[c]
17 if sn ≡ 0 mod ke:
18 create checkpoint for sn with u and Application
19 on stable checkpoint(SeqNr s, u′, Application'):
20 commit−IRMC.move_window(0, s + 1)
21 if s ≥ sn: apply checkpoint to sn, u and Application
Agreement Replica
22 sn := 0 // Current sequence number
23 t [c] := 0 // Counter values of latest agreed request; used by consensus
24 t+[c] := 0 // Counter values for next expected request
25 AG−WIN ≥ ka // Size of agreement window
26 win := [1,AG−WIN] // Range with [lower, upper] bound (inclusive)
27 hist := last |commit−IRMC window | Execute messages
28 for each client c and execution group e in parallel:
29 while true:
30 m := request−IRMC.receive(c, t+[c]) from group e
31 if m = ⟨TooOld, tc ⟩: t+[c] := tc
32 else: //m = ⟨Reqest, ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩, e ⟩
33 Consensus order request m
34 t+[c] := t+[c] + 1
35 on Consensus ordered(SeqNr s,
r = ⟨Reqest, ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩, e ⟩):
36 sleep until upper limit of win > s
37 sn := s
38 t [c] := tc
39 t+[c] := max(tc + 1, t+[c])
40 commit−IRMC.send(0, s, ⟨Execute, r, s ⟩) for each
execution group e and add Execute to hist
41 if sn ≡ 0 mod ka:
42 create checkpoint for sn with t, hist
43 on stable checkpoint(SeqNr s, t ′, hist'):
44 commit−IRMC.move_window(0, s − |hist’ | + 1)
45 Consensus collect garbage before s + 1
46 if s > sn:
47 h_missing := { ⟨Execute, r, s′⟩ ∈ hist' | s′ ∈ [sn + 1, s]}
48 apply checkpoint to sn, t and hist
49 for each execution group e:
50 send h_missing via commit−IRMC of group e
51 win := [s+1, s+AG−WIN]
Figure 5. Spider protocol for writes (pseudo code)
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receiver-replica group (see below). Checkpoints are period-
ically created after a group has agreed on / processed the
message for a sequence number s that satisfies s ≡ 0mod k .
The checkpoint interval k of a replica group is configurable
and for the execution to sustain liveness must be smaller
than the maximum capacity of the group’s input IRMC. The
agreement-checkpoint interval ka may be selected indepen-
dently from the interval for execution checkpoints ke .
Agreement Checkpoints. Having completed the consen-
sus process for a request for which a checkpoint is due, an
agreement replica creates an agreement snapshot and in-
cludes (1) a vector t that for each client contains the counter
value tc of the client’s latest agreed request and (2) the last
Executemessages corresponding to the commit subchannel
capacity (L. 41–42 in Figure 5). In a next step, the agreement
replica computes a hashh over the snapshot and sends a mes-
sage ⟨Checkpoint,h, s⟩ protected with a digital signature
to all members of its group. Having obtained fa + 1 correctly
signed and matching checkpoint messages for the same se-
quence number, a replica has proof that its snapshot is cor-
rect. At this point, the replica can move forward its separate
window used to ensure the periodic creation of a new check-
point (L. 36 and 51) and also instruct the consensus protocol
to garbage collect preceding consensus instances (L. 45).
Agreement replicas require periodic checkpoints to con-
tinue ordering new requests and thus there is at least one
correct agreement replica that possesses both a correspond-
ing valid checkpoint as well as proof of the checkpoint’s cor-
rectness in the form of fa + 1matching checkpoint messages.
As a consequence, if a correct agreement replica falls behind
and queries its group members for the latest checkpoint, the
replica will eventually be able to acquire this checkpoint, ver-
ify it, and apply it in order to catch up by skipping consensus
instances. In such case, the checkpoint enables the replica to
learn (1) the request-subchannel positions at which to query
the IRMC for the next client requests and (2) the Executes
of the skipped consensus instances (L. 48–50).
Execution Checkpoints. Execution-group checkpointing
follows the same basic work flow as in the agreement group.
An execution snapshot comprises a copy of the application
state and the latest reply to each client, similar to the check-
points in Omada [26]. This information enables a trailing ex-
ecution replica to consistently update its local state without
needing to process all agreed requests. When an execution
checkpoint for a sequence number s becomes stable at an exe-
cution replica, the replica moves the flow-control window of
its incoming commit channel to s +1 (L. 19–21). This ensures
that agreed requests are only discarded after at least one cor-
rect execution replica has collected a stable checkpoint. Note
that there is no need for checkpoints to contain requests. A
client moves its request subchannel’s window forward by is-
suing a new request, thereby confirming that the old request
can be garbage-collected from the IRMC. This also allows ex-
ecution replicas to skip forward to the current request (L. 31).
3.5 Global Flow Control
With the flow-control mechanism of an IRMC only operat-
ing at the communication level between two replica groups,
Spider takes additional measures to coordinate the message
flow at the point where the endpoints of multiple IRMCs
meet: the agreement group. Specifically, there are two types
of messages (i.e., new requests received through request
channels and Executes sent through commit channels) that
have individual characteristics and are handled in differ-
ent ways: (1) With regard to incoming requests, agreement
replicas represent the receiver side of request channels and
therefore directly manage the positions of the channels’ flow-
control windows. As described in Section 3.4, to be able to
quickly retrieve new requests an agreement replica updates
the counter value of each client’s latest request each time
an agreement checkpoint becomes stable. (2) With regard
to outgoing Executes, in contrast, agreement replicas rep-
resent the sender side of commit channels and therefore
depend on the respective execution group at the other end
of each channel to move the flow-control window forward.
To prevent a single execution group from delaying overall
progress, agreement replicas in Spider do not wait until they
are able to submit a newly produced Execute to every out-
going commit channel. Instead, having completed inserting
an Execute for a sequence number s into ne − z commit
channels an agreement replica is allowed to continue; ne is
the total number of execution groups in the system and z
a configurable value (0 ≤ z < ne ). To inform the execution
groups of trailing commit channels, once such a request is
garbage-collected a replica updates the channels’ window
positions to sequence number s + 1. If an affected execution
replica subsequently tries to receive Executes for sequence
numbers of s or lower, the commit channel responds with an
exception (see Section 3.2). In reaction, the execution replica
starts to seek a stable execution checkpoint, querying mem-
bers of both its own group and others, in order to compensate
for the missed messages.
3.6 Adaptability
Spider’s modular architecture makes it possible to dynami-
cally change the number of execution groups in the system
and thereby adjust to varying workloads.With the consensus
protocol being limited to the agreement group, in contrast
to traditional BFT systems such a reconfiguration in Spider
does not require complex mechanisms or subprotocols.
Adding an Execution Group. To add a new execution
group e to the system, a privileged admin client first starts the
replicas of the group and then submits an ⟨AddGroup, e, E⟩
message; E is a set containing the identity and address of
each group member. As soon as the agreement process for
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this message is complete, agreement replicas establish an
IRMC pair (i.e., a request channel and a commit channel)
to the new execution group, update the execution-replica
registry to reflect the changes, and start the reception of
requests and the forwarding of Executes. Trying to obtain
an Execute for sequence number 0, the new replicas will
be notified by their commit channels that they have fallen
behind and consequently use the mechanism of Section 3.5
to fetch an execution checkpoint from another group.
Removing an Execution Group. To remove an existing
execution group e from the system, the administrator client
submits a ⟨RemoveGroup, e⟩ message that, once agreed on,
causes the agreement replicas to update the execution-replica
registry and close their IRMCs to the affected group.
3.7 Handling Faulty Clients and Replicas
Besides enabling Spider’s modular architecture, IRMCs also
play a crucial role when it comes to limiting the impact faulty
clients and replicas can have on the system. In this context,
especially one IRMC property is of major importance: the
fact that a channel only delivers a message after f +1 senders
submitted it and the channel therefore has proof that at least
one correct sender vouches for the message’s validity (see
Section 3.2). If, for example, a faulty client either sends con-
flicting requests to an execution group or the same request to
fewer than fe + 1 execution replicas, the request channel of
the affected execution group prevents the message’s delivery
to the agreement group. Note that in such case the effects
of the faulty client are strictly limited to the subchannel of
this client, which will not deliver a request if fewer than
fe + 1 execution replicas insert the same message. As exe-
cution replicas use a dedicated request subchannel for each
client, the subchannels of correct clients remain unaffected.
If faulty execution replicas collaborate with a faulty client,
different agreement replicas may receive different values
for this client’s requests. For example, a faulty client might
submit a different request R1, R2, . . . , Rfe+1 to each of the
fe + 1 correct execution replicas of one group and provide
all requests to the fe faulty execution replicas of that group.
Depending on which of the request versions the faulty exe-
cution replicas transmit to which agreement replica, in such
a situation it is possible that some agreement replicas ob-
tain an fe + 1 quorum for request R1 while others receive
fe + 1 matching messages for request R2 and so on. Again,
the effects are limited to the faulty client’s subchannel, re-
quests of correct clients can proceed as usual. This scenario
is not specific to Spider, but in a similar way can also oc-
cur in traditional BFT systems [18, 26, 49, 54, 55], in which
clients directly submit their possibly conflicting requests to
the replicas performing the agreement. Consequently, all BFT
protocols that tolerate faulty clients already comprise mecha-
nisms to handle this scenario. This is usually combined with
only executing client requests with a counter value which is
higher than the highest value processed so far for that client,
which ensures that old or duplicate requests are skipped.
Besides tolerating faulty clients, agreement protocols in
general also provide means that allow correct follower repli-
cas to elect a new leader if the current leader is faulty and, for
example, fails to start the consensus process for a new client
request within a given timeout [18, 26, 49, 54, 55]. To be able
to monitor the leader, follower replicas must obtain informa-
tion about incoming requests. In Spider, this is ensured by
the fact that request channels only garbage-collect a request
from a correct client if the latter has successfully obtained a
valid reply. A request for which this is not the case will be up-
loaded to all correct members of the client’s execution group
and through this group’s request channel eventually reach
all correct follower agreement replica, thereby enabling fol-
lowers to hold the leader accountable.
In addition, faulty agreement replicas cannot forward ma-
nipulated messages via the commit channel. As the consen-
sus process ensures that all correct agreement replicas deliver
the same total order of requests, eventually fa + 1 correct
agreement replicas will send matching messages enabling
the execution groups to receive the correctly ordered re-
quests. In contrast, the delivery of faulty requests sent by
the faulty agreement replicas is prevented by the IRMC.
4 IRMC Implementations
In this section, we present two different variants to imple-
ment inter-regional message channels, focusing on simplic-
ity (IRMC-RC) and efficiency (IRMC-SC), respectively. Addi-
tional variants are possible, as discussed in Section 6.
IRMC with Receiver-side Collection (IRMC-RC). The re-
ceiver endpoint of an IRMC only delivers a messagem for a
specific subchannel sc and position p if at least fs +1 senders
previously instructed the channel to transmit a message with
identical content for the same subchannel position (see Sec-
tion 3.2). As illustrated in Figure 6a, the IRMC-RC solves
this problem by each sender endpoint Sx directly forward-
ing a ⟨Send,m, sc,p⟩Sx ,X message and thereby enabling each
receiver endpoint to individually collect fs +1matching mes-
sages. To allow receivers to verify the origin and integrity
of a Send, a sender signs messages with its private key X.
When a receiver requests a subchannel’s flow-control win-
dow to be shifted, its receiver endpoint Ry submits a signed
⟨Move, sc,p⟩Ry,Y message to all sender endpoints. For each
receiver and subchannel, a sender endpoint stores theMove
message with the highest position p and sets the subchan-
nel’s window start to the fr + 1 highest position requested
by any receiver (see Section 3.2). To request a shift of a sub-
channel’s flow-control window, sender endpoints also send
Move messages which the receivers process analogously.
IRMCwith Sender-sideCollection (IRMC-SC). IRMC-SCs
minimize the number of messages transferred across wide-
area links by applying the concept of collectors [29]. That is,
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Figure 6. Overview of two possible IRMC implementations.
sender endpoints in IRMC-SCs do not submit their Sends
to the receiver side but, as indicated in Figure 6b, instead
exchange signed hashes of them within the sender group.
Each sender endpoint serves as a collector, which means
that the endpoint assembles a vector ®v of fs + 1 correct sig-
natures from different senders for the same Send message
content sm. Having obtained this vector, a collector Sx sends
it in a signed ⟨Certificate, sm, ®v⟩Sx ,X message to one or
more receiver endpoints. On reception, a receiver verifies
the validity of the Certificate by checking both the signa-
tures of the message and the fs + 1 signatures contained in
the vector ®v . If all of these signatures are correct and match
the Send message content sm, the endpoint has proof that
sm is valid as it was sent by at least one correct replica and
delivers the associated message to its receiver on request.
IRMC-SC receiver endpoints individually select the sender
endpoint serving as their current collector and announce
these decisions attached to their Moves. As a protection
against faulty collectors, all sender endpoints periodically
transmit ⟨Progress, ®p⟩Sx ,X messages directly to receiver
endpoints in which they include a vector ®p with the highest
position of each subchannel for which they have a Certifi-
cate. If at least fs +1 sender endpoints claim to have reached
a certain position but a receiver’s collector fails to provide a
corresponding and valid Certificate within a configurable
amount of time, the endpoint switches to a different collector.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate Spider in com-
parison to existing approaches for BFT wide-area replication.
Environment. To compare different techniques, we imple-
mented a Java-based prototype that can be configured to
reflect three different system architectures (cf. Section 2.2):
(1) BFT represents the traditional approach of distributing a
single set of replicas across different geographic locations. It
relies on PBFT [18] as agreement protocol and uses HMAC-
SHA-256 as MACs to authenticate the messages exchanged
between replicas. (2) HFT employs a hierarchical system
architecture running the two-level Steward protocol [6] to
coordinate multiple sites that each host a dedicated clus-
ter of replicas. Steward requires threshold cryptography for
which HFT uses the scheme proposed by Shoup [48] based
on 1024-bit RSA signatures. (3) Spider represents our sys-
tem architecture proposed in this paper. In this evaluation,
Spider’s agreement group runs PBFT for consensus and its
IRMCs protect their messages with 1024-bit RSA signatures.
To conduct our experiments in an actual wide-area en-
vironment, we start virtual machines (t3.small, 2 VCPUs,
2GBRAM, Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS, OpenJDK 11) in 4 Amazon
EC2 regions across the globe (Virginia, Oregon, Ireland,
and Tokyo). In each of these regions, we deploy 50 clients
that issue 100 writes/reads per second (200 bytes) to a key-
value store provided by our systems under test; client mes-
sages carry 1024-bit RSA signatures. Given this client setting,
our architectures demand the following replica placement
for f = 1: For BFT, 1 replica is hosted in each of the 4 regions.
HFT expects a cluster of 4 replicas in each region, which is
used as contact cluster for local clients. For Spider, we deploy
1 execution group (3 replicas) per region, distributed across
different availability zones. In addition, we start Spider’s
4 agreement replicas in separate Virginia availability zones.
Writes. In our first experiment, we examine the latency of
writes issued by clients at different sites. Based on the results
presented in Figure 7, we make three important observa-
tions: (1) In all evaluated architectures the response times
to a major degree depend on a client’s geographic location.
For BFT and HFT, clients in Virginia for example benefit
from the fact that their local replica (cluster) experiences
comparably short round-trip times when communicating
with its counterparts in Oregon and Ireland. In particular,
this results in low latency when the Virginia replica (clus-
ter) acts as leader of the wide-area consensus protocol and
is able to reach a quorum together with these two other
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Figure 7. 50th ( ) and 90th ( ) percentiles of write latencies
for different client and leader locations including Virginia (V),
Oregon (O), Ireland (I), and Tokyo (T).
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Figure 8. 50th ( ) and 90th ( ) percentiles of read latencies.
sites. In Spider, clients in Virginia also observe low write
latency, but for a different reason. Here, the fact that the
agreement group resides in the same region as the clients’
local execution group allows clients in Virginia to achieve
response times of as low as 13 milliseconds. (2) For each
client location, Spider provides significantly lower latency
than BFT (up to 95 %) and HFT (up to 94 %). This is a direct
consequence of the fact that in contrast to the other two
system architectures Spider does not execute a full-fledged
replication protocol over wide-area links. Instead, a write
request only has to wait for two wide-area hops: from a
client’s local execution group to the agreement group and
back. The distribution of the ordered write request to other
execution groups is handled by the agreement group and
thus does not require execution groups to explicitly wait
for each other. That is, when an execution replica in Spi-
der receives an Execute for a write from the agreement
group, the replica can immediately process the operation
and return a reply to the client. (3) The response times of
BFT and HFT vary considerably depending on the position
of the current leader of the wide-area consensus protocol.
HFT clients in Ireland, for example, experience a 53 % higher
latency when the leader is positioned in Tokyo compared to
when the leader role is assigned to Virginia. In contrast, the
specific location of the agreement-group leader in Spider
only has a negligible effect on overall response times due
to all agreement replicas residing in the same region, result-
ing in stable response times even across leader changes.
Reads. In our second experiment, we compare the evaluated
architectures regarding the performance of their individual
(fast-)paths for read operations with different consistency
guarantees. As the results in Figure 8 show, response times
of strongly consistent reads in Spider display a similar pat-
tern as writes due to following the same path through the
system. For clients in Tokyo, this leads to slightly higher
response times compared with BFT and HFT, which in this
case benefit from directly querying replicas without inter-
mediaries in between. For all other client locations, Spider’s
approach, which only requires waiting for one wide-area
round trip from a client’s execution group to the agreement
group and back, enables lower latency than provided by BFT
and HFT. With regard to weakly consistent reads, both HFT
and Spider achieve response times of 2 milliseconds or less,
as these operations can be entirely handled by replicas in
a client’s vicinity and therefore do not require wide-area
communication as in BFT.
Modularity Impact. In our third experiment, we quan-
tify the impact of our decision to design Spider as a mod-
ular architecture that separates agreement from execution
and consists of loosely coupled replica groups connected
via IRMCs. We create two variants of Spider where (1) the
agreement group also executes requests and is the only group
in the system (Spider-0E) and (2) there is only one execu-
tion group that is co-located with the agreement group in
Virginia (Spider-1E). While, Spider-0E allows us to study
Spider without IRMC and externalized execution, based on
Spider-1E we can assess the influence of an IRMC without
wide-area delays. Our results show that when clients access
Spider-0E and Spider-1E from different sites, response times
are dominated by the wide-area communication between
clients and replicas. Thus, the modularization overhead is
small and adds less than 14 milliseconds (see Figure 9a).
IRMC Implementations. In our fourth experiment, we
evaluate the two IRMC variants presented in Section 4 by es-
tablishing a channel of each type betweenVirginia and Tokyo
and submitting messages of different sizes. The comparison
of results in Figures 9b–9d confirm the two implementations
to have individual characteristics. Without the need to verify
signatures for Certificate messages, IRMC-RC sender end-
points require less CPU resources per message and therefore
enable IRMC-RCs to achieve a higher maximum throughput.
On the other hand, forwarding only one wide-area message
per receiver endpoint IRMC-SCs significantly reduce the
amount of data transferred over long-distance links, thereby
saving costs in public-cloud environments.
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Figure 10. Impact of a new client site on overall latency.
Adaptability. In our fifth experiment, we evaluate the write
and read performance new clients experience when they join
the system at an additional location. For this purpose, we
start with our usual setting and after 80 seconds launch
50 clients in the EC2 region Sao Paulo. Once running, the
new clients in BFT and HFT issue their requests to exist-
ing replicas, while for Spider they contact an additional
execution group also set up in Sao Paulo. Involving more
client sites than replica sites in BFT and HFT, the setting in
this experiment represents a typical use-case scenario for
weighted-voting approaches (see Section 2.2). We therefore
repeat the experiment with a fourth system (BFT-WV) that
extends BFT with weighted voting and comprises a replica
at each of the five client locations. As required by weighted
voting, two of the five replicas are assigned higher weights
in the consensus protocol. Specifically, these are the repli-
cas in Virginia and Oregon because this weight distribution
achieves the best performance in our evaluation scenario.
Figure 10 presents the results of this experiment showing
the average response times observed across all active client
sites. To save space, we omit the results for strongly consis-
tent reads as they show a similar picture as writes. For each
system, we evaluate different leader locations, but for clar-
ity Figure 10 only reports the results of the configurations
achieving the lowest response times for each system.
Figure 10a shows that the overall write latency increases
for all evaluated architectures once the clients in Sao Paulo
join the system. This is a consequence of the fact that due to
its geographic location EC2’s Sao Paulo region has compara-
bly high transmission times to other cloud regions. Clients in
Sao Paulo therefore observe response times between about
124 milliseconds (Spider) and about 298 milliseconds (BFT),
which alone causes the measurable jumps in the overall write
latency averages; the response times for clients in other re-
gions remain unaffected. Interestingly, BFT and BFT-WV
achieve similar write performance throughout the experi-
ment and thereby confirm that weighted voting does not
automatically improve response times. This is only true
when the additional replica is located at a site that is better
connected than the existing ones and therefore enables the
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Figure 11. 50th ( ) and 90th ( ) percentiles of write laten-
cies for different client sites when tolerating f = 2 faults.
wide-area consensus protocol to reach faster quorums. In
the setting evaluated here, BFT’s typical consensus quorum
is based on the votes of the replicas in Virginia, Oregon, and
Ireland and therefore already provides better performance
than any combination that includes the replica in Sao Paulo.
As shown in Figure 10b, of the evaluated architectures
Spider is the only one that allows the new clients in Sao
Paulo to perform weakly consistent reads with low latency.
While all other systems require the clients in Sao Paulo to
read from at least one remote replica and consequently expe-
rience overall read-latency increases of up to 23 milliseconds,
Spider makes it possible to introduce an execution group in
the new region to efficiently handle the reads of local clients.
Tolerating Two Faults. In our final experiment, we exam-
ine write latencies for settings that are configured to tolerate
f = 2 faults in each agreement and execution group. We
place the additional replicas into nearby EC2 regions (Ohio,
California, London, Seoul) to make use of further fault do-
mains. The results in Figure 11 show that due to increased
communication latency within groups both HFT and Spider
see a moderate increase of response times by up to 46 mil-
liseconds compared with the f = 1 setting, with Spider still
providing significantly lower latency than BFT and HFT.
6 Related Work
Adaptive BFT Replication. Spider is not the first work to
argue that it is crucial to enable BFT systems to dynamically
adapt to changing conditions. Abstract [7] makes it possi-
ble to substitute the consensus protocol of a BFT system at
runtime, for example, switching to a more robust algorithm
once a replica failure has been suspected or detected. Cheap-
BFT [32] and ReBFT [21] follow a similar idea by comprising
two different agreement protocols (one for the normal case
and one for fault handling) of which only one is active at a
time. In contrast, the reconfiguration mechanism developed
by Carvalho et al. [17] for BFT-SMaRt [15] temporarily runs
two consensus algorithms in parallel to achieve a more effi-
cient switch. As a result of Spider’s modularity, integrating
support for the dynamic substitution of the agreement proto-
col is feasible and the use of customized protocols designed
for high performance [11, 39] or strong resilience [5, 8]
would not require modifications to execution groups.
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Other works allow BFT systems to dynamically change
specific protocol properties at runtime. Depending on the cur-
rent workload, de Sá et al. [20], for example, vary the param-
eters deciding how many requests are batched together and
ordered within a single consensus instance. Berger et al. [12]
rely on a weighted voting scheme [49] and by changing
weights adjust the individual impact a replica has on the
outcome of the agreement process. While adapting the batch
size can be a measure to improve the performance of Spi-
der’s agreement group, the use of a weighted voting scheme
in general is only effective if (1) a system contains more than
the minimum number of agreement replicas and (2) agree-
ment replicas are located in different geographic regions;
both of these points do not apply to Spider.
Communication Between Replica Groups. Amir et al.
proposed BLinks [4] as a means to send the totally ordered
outputs of one replicated state machine to another repli-
cated state machine that uses them as inputs. Unfortunately,
the requirement of a channel-wide total order prevents Spi-
der from relying on BLinks as execution replicas do not
necessarily have to use the same order when submitting
new requests to the agreement group via their request chan-
nels. IRMCs, on the other hand, do not have this restriction
and furthermore comprise a built-in flow-control mecha-
nism that represents the basis of Spider’s global flow con-
trol. However, transmitting only a single message between
one dedicated sender and one dedicated receiver, BLinks
may be used as a template for an IRMC implementation
that involves even fewer wide-area messages than IRMC-SC.
Partitioned Agreement Groups. GeoBFT [30] makes use
of replica groups located in different regions, which each run
a full agreement protocol. In each protocol round every group
orders a request yielding a request certificate, which is shared
with all other groups. Afterwards the requests are merged
into a single total order and are executed. This requires all
groups to distribute a certificate in every round, even if it
just contains a placeholder request, and thus all groups must
work at the same time to make progress. In Spider this
requirement only applies to the agreement group whereas
a limited number of slow execution groups can be skipped.
Sharing a request ordering certificate in GeoBFT works by
having the leader replica forward it to f + 1 replicas of each
group, which then further forward the certificate within their
group. This request distribution scheme represents a middle
ground between BLinks and IRMC-SCs. Unlike IRMCs it is
coupled with the agreement protocol and has to remotely
trigger a view-change to replace a leader replica which does
not complete the request distribution in a timely manner.
Efficient Client Communication. In most BFT systems,
clients need to receive replies from different replicas in or-
der to prove a result correct [18], which in geo-replicated
settings can significantly increase the number of messages
exchanged over wide-area links. SBFT [29] addresses this
problem by adding a protocol phase that aggregates request
acknowledgements of multiple replicas into a single message
to the client. In Troxy [34], a client also has to wait for a
single reply only, because the reply voter is hosted inside a
trusted domain at the server side and forwards its decisions
to the client through a secure channel. In Spider, clients are
typically located in the same region as an execution group
allowing for communication over short-distance links. For
scenarios in which this is not the case, it would be possible to
extend Spider to use one of the approaches discussed above.
Leader Selection in Geo-replicated Systems. Multiple au-
thors have underlined the impact that the leader-replica
location has on response times, independent of the fault
model, and presented solutions to select the leader in a way
that minimizes overall latency [25, 36, 49]. Other agreement-
based systems do not need to determine a fixed leader as
they continuously rotate the leader role among replicas [37,
38, 41, 53, 54]. As our experiments show, with agreement
replicas residing in different availability zones of the same
cloud region, the specific location of the consensus leader in
Spider only has a negligible effect on response times. Con-
sequently, Spider achieves low and stable latency without
requiring means to dynamically select or rotate the leader.
Crash-tolerantWide-AreaReplication. Several works ad-
dressed the efficiency of geo-replication in systems that un-
like Spider solely tolerate crashes, not Byzantine failures. In
Pileus [51], for example, writes are only handled by a subset
of replicas that first order and execute them, and then bring
all other replicas up to date by transferring state changes.
P-Store [46] improves efficiency in wide-area environments
by performing partial replication, thereby freeing a site from
the need to receive and process all updates. Clock-RSM [22]
establishes a total order on requests by exploiting the times-
tamps of physical clocks and without requiring a dedicated
leader replica. EPaxos [42] in contrast does not rely on a total
request order, but only orders those requests that interfere
with each other due to accessing the same state parts.
7 Conclusion
The cloud-based Spider system architecture models a BFT
system as a collection of loosely coupled replica groups that
can be flexibly distributed in geo-replicated environments. In
contrast to existing approaches, Spider does not require the
execution of complex multi-phase protocols over wide-area
links, but instead performs essential tasks such as consensus,
leader election, and checkpointing across replicas residing in
the same region. Our experiments show that this approach
enables Spider to achieve low and stable response times.
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A Safety and Liveness Proof for Spider
In the following, we first provide a detailed description of the
individual components of Spider, along with the assump-
tions and definitions used for proving the correctness and
liveness properties of Spider. Afterwards, we present the
proof itself and conclude with pseudocode for both IRMC
implementation variants (IRMC-RC and IRMC-SC).
A.1 Fault Assumptions
We assume that each execution group consists of 2fe+1 repli-
cas and that there are up to fe faulty execution replicas per
execution group. The agreement group has 3fa+1 replicas of
which up to fa agreement replicas may be faulty. All faults
are assumed to be Byzantine.
We assume a partially synchronous network with periods
of synchrony which are long enough to allow the protocol
to make progress [23].
A.2 Cryptographic Primitives and Assumptions
The pseudocode uses the following cryptographic primitives:
• sign(m): Digitally sign messagem (e.g., using RSA).
• valid_sigE (m): Verify that the signature for messagem
is valid and that the signer is part of group E.
• maca, e (m): Add a single MAC (message authentication
code) such that replica a authenticates messagem to-
wards replica e [52]. This primitive, for example, may
be implemented using HMAC-SHA-256.
• maca, E (m): Add a MAC vector such that replica a au-
thenticates message m to a replica group E [18]. It
consists of a MAC for each replica in group E.
• valid_maca, e (m) and valid_maca, E (m) are used to ver-
ify these MACs.
• unwrap_mac(m): Strips the added MAC from mes-
sagem and returns the original message.
• h(m): Calculate a cryptographically secure hash digest
of messagem, for example using SHA-256.
We make the standard assumptions regarding cryptographic
functions. We assume them to be secure, that is a malicious
replica cannot forge signatures /MACs of other replicas nor
can it create a messagem′ ,m with hash h(m) = h(m′).
A.3 Consistency Guarantees
Spider provides linearizability for write requests. Read re-
quests with strong consistency are treated similarly, but only
the designated execution group gets the full request, whereas
all other groups just receive the client id and counter.
Weakly consistent reads provide one-copy serializability.
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interface Agreement {
// Request ordering of message m
void order(Message m);
// Must deliver request in order without gaps
// Blocking callback, that is the agreement can only deliver the next
message after the previous deliver call has completed
// Delays in deliver may cause timeouts in the agreement black−box
to expire
callback deliver(SeqNr s, Message m);
// Forget everything before (<) sequence number s
// After this call no sequence number < s must be delivered
void gc(SeqNr s);
}
Figure 12. Agreement black-box interface (pseudo code)
Section A.7.9 contains the relevant proofs and definitions
of the consistency guarantees.
A.4 Definitions
We first describe the properties provided by Spider before
describing the required assumptions for the agreement black-
box and the checkpoint component.
A.4.1 Properties of Spider. The definitions of E-Safety
and E-Validity follow the lines of those used for Steward [6].
E-Safety II and E-Liveness are adapted from PBFT [18]. E-
Validity II captures the usual at-most-once guarantee.
Definition A.1 (E-Safety). If two correct servers execute
the ith write, then these writes are identical.
Definition A.2 (E-Safety II). The system provides lineariz-
ability regarding requests from correct clients.
Definition A.3 (E-Validity). Only a correctly authenticated
write request from a client may be executed.
Definition A.4 (E-Validity II). A write request may be exe-
cuted at most once.
Definition A.5 (E-Liveness). A correct client will eventu-
ally receive a reply to its request.
A.4.2 Agreement Black-Box. We assume the agreement
to be a black-box with the interface shown in Figure 12
and the following properties. The comments at the interface
methods detail their expected behavior. We assume that the
first delivered sequence number is 1.
Definition A.6 (A-Safety). If two correct agreement repli-
cas deliver a message for sequence number s , then these
messages are identical.
Definition A.7 (A-Liveness). If 2f + 1 correct replicas re-
ceive a messagem for ordering, then eventually f +1 correct
replicas will deliver messagem and all preceding messages.
interface Checkpoint {
// Create and distribute own checkpoint message
// By default only checkpoint components within a single group
communicate with each other (i.e., checkpoints are group specific)
void gen_cp(SeqNr s, State st);
// Sequence numbers of delivered checkpoints must increase
monotonically
// Older checkpoints must be skipped, if a newer checkpoint has
already been delivered
callback stable_cp(SeqNr s, State st);
// Actively fetch requested checkpoint
void fetch_cp(SeqNr s);
}
Figure 13. Checkpoint-component interface (pseudo code)
Definition A.8 (A-Validity). A correct agreement replica
will only deliver correctly authenticated client requests.
Definition A.9 (A-Order). A correct agreement replica will
deliver amessage for sequence number s only after all preced-
ing sequence numbers were delivered or garbage collected.
These requirements are for example fulfilled by PBFT [18].
A.4.3 Checkpoint Component. We assume that each
replica has a checkpoint component with the interface from
Figure 13 and the following properties. The comments at the
interface methods detail their expected behavior.
Definition A.10 (Stable checkpoint). A checkpoint is called
stable once a correct replica collects a certificate consisting
of f + 1 valid and matching checkpoint messages.
Once a replica possesses a stable checkpoint it will call
stable_cp with the checkpoint, unless it has already de-
livered a checkpoint with a higher sequence number.
Definition A.11 (CP-Safety). A stable checkpoint was cre-
ated by at least one correct replica.
As shown later on, all correct replicas in a group will create
identical checkpoints for the same sequence number.
Definition A.12 (CP-Liveness). If one correct replica of a
group delivers a checkpoint, then eventually all correct repli-
cas of that group will deliver that checkpoint, unless a newer
checkpoint was already delivered.
Definition A.13 (CP-Liveness II). Once f + 1 correct repli-
cas create and distribute identical checkpoint messages, the
checkpoint will eventually become stable, unless it is super-
seded by a newer one before.
An implementation should consider the following aspects:
• With an execution group size of 2fe + 1 CP-Safety
requires that each checkpoint message is authenticated
using a signature.
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/∗ Sender endpoint ∗/
interface IRMC_Sender {
// If p is too old: discardm and return immediately
// If p is in the current window: sendm and return immediately
// If p is after the current window (p > max (I RMCsc .win)): block
/wait
void send(Subchannel sc, Position p, Message m);
// Ask receiver endpoint to move the window forward
// The receiver endpoint will internally call move_window with the
fs + 1−highest received position
void move_window(Subchannel sc, Position p);
}
/∗ Receiver endpoint ∗/
interface IRMC_Receiver {
// Blocks until (1) a messagem is delivered, then returnsm, or until
(2) the window is ahead of p , that is p < min(I RMCsc .win),
then returns ⟨TooOld, s ⟩, with s = new window lower bound
Message receive(Subchannel sc, Position p);
// Position p must increase monotonically, calls with lower values are
silently ignored
void move_window(Subchannel sc, Position p);
}
Figure 14. IRMC interfaces (pseudo code)
• In order to provide CP-Liveness correct replicas must
continuously inform / query each other about their
latest stable checkpoint.
• A checkpointmessage ⟨Checkpoint,h, s⟩ for sequence
number s with h = h(st) only contains a hash of the
checkpoint state st to keep the network overhead low.
• The full checkpoint state should only be transferred
when necessary.
A.4.4 Application. We assume that the application is im-
plemented as a deterministic state machine which can exe-
cute client requests and provide a reply to them. In addition,
the application must be able to retrieve and apply a check-
point. The latter functionalities are denoted as assignment
app := app’ and passing app to cp.gen_cp in pseudo code.
DefinitionA.14 (RSM). Different application instances have
an identical state for sequence number i when processing
writes according to the same total order [47].
A.5 IRMC Properties
The sender and receiver endpoint interfaces of the IRMC
are shown in Figure 14. As before, the comments specify
the expected behavior of the methods. All sender replicas
are contained in the set Rs and all receiver replicas in Rr .
The capacity of an IRMC (subchannel) is denoted as |IRMC |
and is assumed to be ≥ 1. It is identical for all subchannels
of an IRMC. IRMCsc .win refers to the window of subchan-
nel sc , which is initialized to start at 1.min(IRMCsc .win) and
max(IRMCsc .win) return the lower and upper limit
(inclusive) of the window of subchannel sc , respectively.
receive(sc,p) = m denotes that the receive call returned
the messagem.
Definition A.15 (IRMC-Correctness I). Receive only re-
turns a message sent by a correct sender:
receive(sc,p) =m → a correct sender called send(sc,p,m) ∧
the receiver calledmove_window(sc,p ′) such that p ′ ≤ p <
p ′ + |IRMCsc |.
Definition A.16 (IRMC-Correctness II). Moving a window
requires a move request by at least one correct replica:
receive(sc,p) = ⟨TooOld,p ′⟩ with p ′ > p → a correct
sender calledmove_window(sc, pˆ) with pˆ ≥ p ′ ∨ a correct
receiver calledmove_window(sc, pˆ) with pˆ ≥ p ′.
Remark. Calls to send block if the requested position is after
the upper limit of the current subchannel window. Calls to
receive block if the position is in or after the subchannel
window and the corresponding message was not yet received
by the IRMC.
Definition A.17 (IRMC-Liveness I). An identical message
sent (sendmethod call has returned) by at least fs +1 correct
replicas will eventually cause some message to be received
by all correct receivers unless it is skipped (see also IRMC-
Correctness II):
If fs + 1 correct senders call send(sc,p,m), then eventually
∀ correct r ∈ Rs that call(ed) receive(sc,p) : receive(sc,p)=∗
∨ receive(sc,p) = ⟨TooOld,p ′⟩ with p ′ > p.
Remark. Due to IRMC-Correctness I the received message
can only be one that was sent by at least one correct sender.
Definition A.18 (IRMC-Liveness II). Send calls return once
the position is below the subchannel window’s upper bound:
If fr + 1 correct receivers r ∈ Rr callmove_window(sc,pr ),
then eventually all send(sc,p ′,m) calls will have returned
on all correct sender replicas where p ′ < p˜ + |IRMCsc | and
p˜ = f + 1-largest pr .
Definition A.19 (IRMC-Liveness III). Receiver endpoints
will move the window at least as far as the fs + 1-highest
move_win request by a sender replica:
If fs +1 correct senders callmove_window(sc,ps ), then even-
tually all correct receiver endpoints will have (internally)
calledmove_window(sc,p)with p such that largest ps ≥ p ≥
f + 1-largest ps .
Remark. Note that if a receiver endpoint has already moved
a subchannel window to a higher position than p, then the call
to move_win has no effect.
A.6 Spider Pseudo Code
The pseudo code for the client is shown in Figure 15, for the
execution replica in Figure 16 and for the agreement replica
in Figure 17.
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1 tc := 1 // Client request counter
2 r ep :=  // Reply for last request
3 д := {} // Collected replies
4 E := nearest execution group with |E | = 2fe + 1
5 write(Write w):
6 // Authenticate request
7 m := macc,E(siдnc(⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩))
8 r ep := 
9 д := {}
10 // Repeat sending until reply was received
11 repeat until r ep , :
12 broadcast m to E
13 sleep for tr etry ∨ until r ep , 
14 tc := tc + 1
15 return r ep
16
17 on receive(m = ⟨Reply, u, t ′c ⟩ from e ∈ E):
18 // Only process correctly authenticated replies
19 // Each replica may only send one
20 if valid_mace,c(m)∧t ′c = tc ∧ ⟨Reply, ∗, ∗⟩ from e < д:
21 д := д ∪ {m }
22 // Return reply after receiving fe+1 replies with matching tc and u
23 if ∃u : | {v |v = ⟨Reply, u, tc ⟩ ∈ д } | ≥ fe + 1:
24 r ep := u
Figure 15. Client c (pseudo code)
We assume that eachmethod is executed atomically, unless
it calls a blocking method, at which point execution may
switch to other methods. Variable definitions are written
as var := value, whereas = is used for comparisons and
destructuring of values, for example x = ⟨Execute, r , s ′⟩
uses the value in x to define r and s ′ using pattern matching.
A.7 Proof
The proof primarily considers write requests. We assume for
now that there is only one execution group, that isne = 1 and
z = 0. Later on, we will relax this assumption. Strongly and
weakly consistent read requests are considered afterwards.
We write "L. 15.5" to refer to Line 5 in Figure 15.
A.7.1 Agreement-Checkpoint Equivalence (CP-A-
Equivalence).
Definition A.20 (CP-A-Equivalence). The state of an agree-
ment replica (sn , t , hist and queued commit IRMCs mes-
sages) that has reached sequence number s via processing
ag.deliver(s, r ) (L. 17.25) is equivalent to that of a replica
that reaches sequence number s by applying a checkpoint
for sequence number s .
Proof. We prove this by induction.
Base case: All correct agreement replicas initialize sn , t ,
hist and the commit IRMCs with identical values. There is
no checkpoint for that sequence number, as no checkpoint
was generated yet.
Induction step: All correct agreement replicas pass through
1 sn := 0 // Sequence number for last executed request
2 t [c] := 0 // Counter of latest forwarded client request
3 u[c] :=  // Reply cache ⟨Reply, uc , tc ⟩
4 app = application, cp = checkpoint component
5 E := execution group
6 rE = request IRMC sender, ∀c : |rE,c | = 2 // Capacity = 2
7 cE = commit IRMC receiver, |cE,0 | ≥ ke // Capacity ≥ ke
8 on receive(m = ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩ from c):
9 // Ignore invalid requests
10 if !valid_macc,E(m): return
11 if tc ≤ t [c]:
12 // Check if a reply is available for the request
13 if u[c] = ⟨Reply, ∗, t ′c ⟩ ∧ t ′c = tc:
14 send mace,c(u[c]) to c
15 return // Silent return on retry with no result yet
16 if !valid_siдc(unwrap_mac(m)): return
17 // Execution replicas must be able to forward a request once
18 // This also applies for the latest client request if an execution replica
already has a reply
19 t [c] := tc
20 // Notify agreement of new request
21 rE.move_window(c, tc)
22 rE.send(c, tc , ⟨Reqest, unwrap_mac(m), E⟩)
23
24 main loop:
25 while true:
26 m := cE.receive(0, sn + 1)
27 if m = ⟨TooOld, s′⟩:
28 // Executor missed some requests→ fetch checkpoint
29 cp.fetch_cp(s′) // Ask other groups if necessary
30 else:
31 m = ⟨Execute, ⟨Reqest, ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩, E′⟩, sn + 1⟩
32 sn := sn + 1
33 // Filter duplicate / old request
34 if u[c] = ⟨Reply, ∗, t ′c ⟩ ∧ t ′c < tc ∨ u[c] = :
35 uc := app.execute(m)
36 u[c] := ⟨Reply, uc , tc ⟩ // Store reply
37 if E = E′: // Only the local execution group sends the
reply to the client
38 send mace,c(u[c]) to c
39 if sn ≡ 0 mod ke: // Periodically create a checkpoint
40 cp.gen_cp(sn, (u, app))
41
42 on cp.stable_cp(s, st = (u′, app')):
43 // Allow garbage collection of commit IRMC
44 cE.move_window(0, s + 1)
45 if s ≥ sn:
46 sn := s
47 app := app'
48 u := u′
Figure 16. Execution replica e (pseudo code)
the same states by processing ordered requests or jump for-
ward to one of those states via a checkpoint.
As updates to the considered state parts are only made in
either ag.deliver (L. 17.25) or cp.stable_cp (L. 17.42), it
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1 sn := 0 // Last ordered sequence number
2 // Force agreement to periodically create a checkpoint
3 win := [1,AG−WIN] // Range with [lower, upper] bound, both inclusive
4 AG−WIN ≥ ka // Size of agreement window
5 t [c] := 0 // Counter values of latest agreed request; used by consensus
6 t+[c] := 0 // Counter values for next expected request
7 hist := last |cE,0 | Executes
8 ag = agreement black−box, cp = checkpoint component
9 for each execution group E:
10 rE = request IRMC receiver, ∀c : |rE,c | = 2
11 cE = commit IRMC sender, |cE,0 | ≥ ke
12 A := agreement group with |A | = 3fa + 1
13 parallel for each client c and execution group E:
14 while true:
15 m := rE.receive(c, t+[c])
16 if m = ⟨TooOld, s ⟩:
17 // Client already sent a newer request
18 t+[c] := s
19 else: //m = ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩
20 // Order request and wait for the next one
21 ag.order(m)
22 t+[c] := t+[c] + 1
23
24 // In−order without gaps between sequence numbers, blocks agreement,
blocking can cause agreement timeouts to expire
25 on ag.deliver(s, r = ⟨Reqest, ⟨Write, w, c, tc ⟩, E⟩):
26 // Sleep if agreement must create a new checkpoint
27 sleep until s ≤ max (win)
28 x := ⟨Execute, r, s ⟩
29 // Update state with new request
30 // Old / duplicated requests could be replaced with no−ops here
31 t [c] := tc
32 t+[c] := max(tc + 1, t+[c])
33 hist.add(x)
34 sn := s
35 parallel for each execution group E:
36 cE.send(0, s, x)
37 sleep until completed for ne − z groups
38 // Not completed parallel calls continue in the background
39 if sn ≡ 0 mod ka: // Periodically create a checkpoint
40 cp.gen_cp(sn, (t, hist))
41
42 on cp.stable_cp(s, st = (t ′, hist ′)):
43 // Move commit window forward
44 parallel for each execution group E:
45 cE.move_window(0, s − |hist ′ | + 1)
46 ag.gc(s + 1)
47 if s > sn:
48 s′n := sn
49 sn := s
50 t := t ′
51 hist := hist ′
52 parallel for each execution group E:
53 // Add missing requests from hist to commit IRMC
54 for x = ⟨Execute, r, s′⟩ ∈ hist, s′ ∈ [s′n + 1, s]:
55 cE.send(0, s′, x)
56 sleep until completed for ne − z groups
57 win := [s+1, s+AG−WIN]
Figure 17. Agreement replica a (pseudo code)
suffices to show that when either of them updates sn to a
certain sequence number, then the resulting replica states
are equivalent. Note that the sequence number sn increases
monotonically as ag.deliver is per A-Order A.9 only called
for increasing sequence numbers and cp.stable_cp only
increases the value of sn (L. 17.47).
Assume that from a common starting point, replicas reach
sequence number s by processing ag.deliver(s, r ) (L. 17.25):
Per A-Safety A.6 and A-Order A.9 all correct agreement
replicas receive the same sequence of requests via their
ag.deliver callback, that is sn , t and hist (L. 17.31) evolve
identically on those replicas. Therefore, a possible later call
to cp.gen_cp(s , (t ,hist )) (L. 17.40) for a sequence number s
has identical parameters on all correct agreement replicas.
As per CP-Safety A.11 only checkpoints which were cre-
ated by at least one correct replica can become stable, any
call of cp.stable_cp(s , (t ′, hist ′)) (L. 17.42) can only deliver
that checkpoint for sequence number s . Applying a check-
point for the current or an older sequence number s ≤ sn
does not change sn , t and hist (L. 17.47). Applying a check-
point for a newer sequence number s > sn atomically sets
sn , t and hist to the state they had when the checkpoint
was created (L. 17.49) and adds missing requests (i.e., those
skipped by updating sn) to the commit IRMCs. The call to
ag.gc(s+1), which happens atomically with the state update,
ensures that ag.deliver will only be called for sequence
numbers ≥ s + 1. Per A-Order A.9 the next ag.deliver call
must be for sn + 1 = s + 1.
When called for an old checkpoint (s ≤ sn ), then cE.move_-
window (L. 17.45) has no effect, as a cE.send call for sn
must already have been issued, such that the IRMC has
queuedmessages at least up to sequence number s . Therefore
max(cE,0.win) ≥ s ⇔ min(cE,0.win) ≥ s − |cE,0 | + 1 that is
the window start is at least at the position requested by the
cE.move_window call, see also the remark below.
For a newer checkpoint, as |hist ′ | = |cE,0 |, this together
with moving the window forward from the sender-side (per
IRMC-Liveness II A.18 and IRMC-Liveness III A.19) is enough
to completely replace the state of the IRMC, if necessary.
Requests that were already contained in the IRMC must be
identical as themessage sent for a specific sequence number s
in ag.deliver or cp.stable_cp (L. 17.36 and 17.55) must
be identical per induction assumption. □
Remark. cE.move_window (L. 17.45) is actually called with
s−|hist ′ |+1which has the same effect as s−|cE,0 |+1 such that
we assume |hist ′ | = |cE,0 | in the following to simplify the pre-
sentation of the proof. As the first delivered agreement sequence
number is 1 and for every delivered request a new message is
added tohist (L. 17.33), the size of |hist | =min(sn , |cE,0 |). Thus
when applying a checkpoint s− |hist ′ |+1 = s−min(s, |cE,0 |)+
1 =max(1, s − |cE,0 | + 1). Asmin(cE,0.win) is initialized with
1 and cE.move_window ignores calls which move the window
backwards, s − |cE,0 | + 1 is equivalent to s − |hist ′ | + 1.
Michael Eischer and Tobias Distler
A.7.2 Execution Safety (E-Safety). To prove property E-
Safety A.1 we start with the following lemma:
Lemma A.21. When two execution replicas e1 and e2 receive
messagem andm′ at position p in the commit channel, then
m =m′.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume thatm ,m′.
Per IRMC-Correctness I A.15 cE.receive(0,p) (L. 16.26) only
delivers a messagem that was sent by a correct agreement
replica, the same holds for m′. Therefore cE.send(0,p,m)
and cE.send(0,p,m′) (either at L. 17.36 or 17.55) must have
been called by a correct agreement replica each. For the
cE.send call in ag.deliver, the agreement black-box must
have delivered messagem andm′ on two correct replicas,
which contradicts A-Safety A.6. And according to CP-A-
Equivalence A.20 the cE.send when applying a checkpoint
in cp.stable_cp is equivalent to the previous send call in
ag.deliver, which contradicts the assumption. □
With this we can prove E-Safety A.1:
Corollary A.22. An execution replica only executes requests
received from the commit channel (compare L. 16.26 - 16.35)
which according to Lemma A.21 cannot receive different re-
quests on different correct execution replicas.
A.7.3 ExecutionCheckpoint Equivalence (CP-E-Equi-
valence).
Definition A.23 (CP-E-Equivalence). The state of an ex-
ecution replica (sn , app and u) that has reached sequence
number sn via processing the corresponding Execute mes-
sage (L. 16.31) for sn is equivalent to that of a replica that
arrives there via a checkpoint for sequence number sn .
The proof follows along the lines of CP-A-Equivalence A.20.
Proof. We prove this by induction.
Base case: All correct execution replicas initialize sn , app
and u with identical values. There is no checkpoint for that
sequence number, as no checkpoint was generated yet.
Induction step: All correct execution replicas pass through
the same states or jump forward to one of those states via
a checkpoint.
As updates to the considered state parts are only made in
either the main loop (L. 16.24) or cp.stable_cp (L. 16.42),
it suffices to show that when either of them updates sn to a
certain sequence number, then the resulting replica states
are equivalent. Note that the sequence number sn increases
monotonically as the main loop only increments it (L. 16.32)
and cp.stable_cp only increases the value of sn (L. 16.45).
Assume that from a common starting point, replicas reach
sequence number sn by processing the corresponding Exe-
cute-message (L. 16.31): As cE.receive(0, sn + 1) (L. 16.26)
is called sequentially (without skipping) for each sequence
number and per E-Safety A.1 all correct execution replicas
process identical requests for each sequence number, the
(atomic) modifications of sn , u[c] and app in the main loop
(L. 16.35 and following) are identical across execution repli-
cas. Either all correct execution replicas come to the identical
decision to skip execution of request r (L. 16.34)based onu[c],
which must be identical across replicas as per induction as-
sumption the replica states were identical which includes
u[c], or according to RSM-property A.14 the execution repli-
cas arrive at identical u[c] and app for sn after processing r .
Therefore a call to cp.gen_cp(s , (u, app)) (L. 16.40) for
sequence number s has identical parameters on all correct
execution replicas and thus per CP-Safety A.11 cp.stable_-
cp(s , (u ′, app’)) (L. 42) can only deliver that checkpoint.
Applying a checkpoint for the current or an older sequence
number s ≤ sn does not change sn , app and u (L. 16.45).
Applying a checkpoint for a newer sequence number s > sn
atomically sets sn , app and u to the state they had when the
checkpoint was created (L. 16.46). Later calls to cE.receive
(L. 16.26) will request the next sequence number after the
checkpoint.
cE.move_window (L. 16.44) will cause any cE.receive
calls for an old sequence number to finish with a TooOld
message and request a sequence number after the checkpoint
on the next iteration. □
A.7.4 Execution Safety II (E-Safety II).
Lemma A.24. When a client accepts a reply for its request,
then that reply is correct and correct execution replicas provide
the same reply.
Proof. A client waits for replies (L. 15.11) from fe +1 different
replicas of its execution groupwith the same content (L. 15.20
and 15.23), such that per failure assumption at least one of
the replies is from a correct execution replica. As shown in
CP-E-Equivalence A.23, all correct execution replicas that
process a request arrive at the same state and result. That
result is either sent directly to the client (L. 16.38) or retrieved
from u[c] on a request retry (L. 16.14). □
We can now prove E-Safety II A.2:
Proof. In order to prove that Spider provides linearizability,
we have to show that requests issued at any point in time
are always executed after all requests for which a client
has accepted the reply, and that the execution follows the
application’s specification [31].
The latter part of the requirement was already shown in
CP-E-Equivalence A.23, which uses the fact that requests are
executed (L. 16.35) in a total order. This also guarantees that
at least one correct replica has processed the Execute mes-
sage for each sequence number. An executed request must
have been delivered by the agreement black-box (see the
proof in Section A.7.2 for E-Safety A.1). Assume that the exe-
cution replicas have executed request r which was ordered at
sequence number s . Now let the execution replicas execute
a request r ′ afterwards which was ordered at a sequence
Resilient Cloud-based Replication with Low Latency
number s ′ with s ′ < s . However, as execution replicas only
process requests in order, this contradicts the assumption
that r was already executed. Thus new requests are always
ordered/executed at a sequence number higher than that of
previously executed requests. Per Lemma A.24 a client can-
not receive different replies from correct execution replicas.
That is as soon as a single correct execution replica sends
a reply to the client, which by construction happens before
that client has accepted the reply, later requests are always
ordered at a higher sequence number. □
Remark. The request IRMCs do not matter for E-Safety A.1
and E-Safety II A.2, as the agreement black-box is safe inde-
pendent of the input.
Remark. It is not necessary to store client messages in an
execution checkpoint as a correct client keeps repeating incom-
plete requests, and as already executed requests are either part
of a checkpoint or still available from the commit IRMC.
Remark. A correct execution replica might not receive a re-
quest from a correct client when the other execution replicas
already have processed it. This is the reason why cp.stable_-
cp at execution replicas must push the window of a client’s
subchannel forward.
A.7.5 ExecutionValidity (E-Validity). E-Validity A.3 fol-
lows as a corollary:
Corollary A.25. Per Lemma A.21 an executed request must
have been delivered by the agreement black-box, and per A-
Validity A.8 only valid client requests are delivered that per
cryptographic assumptions must originate from that client.
A.7.6 Execution Validity II (E-Validity II). Next, we
prove E-Validity II A.4:
Proof. This follows by construction of themain loop (L. 16.24):
Requests which are not either the first request of a client or
which do not have a higher counter value tc than the last one
are skipped (L. 16.34). After executing a request the latest
counter for client c is stored (L. 16.36). As a request cannot
have a counter value higher than its own counter value, it
can be executed at most once. Per CP-E-Equivalence A.23 u
and app are always restored together, such that if the applica-
tion state contains the effects of executing the write request,
this fact is also reflected in u. And therefore the request will
not be executed more than once. □
A.7.7 Execution Liveness (E-Liveness). We now prove
that a correct client will eventually receive a reply to its re-
quest(s). Without loss of generality, we consider all requests
to originate from the same client. For this we show that each
of the processing steps a request passes through will eventu-
ally make progress. The lemmas assume implicitly that the
client has either collected a stable reply (in which case the
request processing is finished) or that it still waits for replies
to its request and thus keeps resending its request.
Lemma A.26. When a correct client sends a new request r ,
then an execution replica will pass it on to its request IRMC
(unless it has already seen a newer request from that client).
Proof. Assume that an execution replica receives a, from its
perspective, new request (L. 16.8). By definition a request
r = ⟨Write,w, c, tc ⟩ sent by a correct client is correctly au-
thenticated and signed (L. 15.7) and therefore passes theMAC
and signature checks (L. 16.10 and 16.16). The counter value
tc is tc > t ′c , with t ′c being the counter value of any older re-
quest, as a correct client always increments its counter value
after accepting a reply (L. 15.14). As t[c] is only modified
when the execution replica receives a valid request from the
client (L. 16.19), it must contain either some older value t ′c
or the default of 0. (The client starts with tc = 1, whereas an
execution replica has t[c] = 0.) Therefore tc > t[c] and the
execution replica calls rE.send(c , tc , unwrap(m)) (L. 16.22).
In case the request is not new to the execution replica,
then the Lemma provides no assurances. □
Lemma A.27. The send call by the execution replicas for the
client’s request IRMC will not block indefinitely.
Proof. The send call only blocks if the request counter tc
> max(rE,c .win), that is the upper bound of the client’s re-
quest subchannel, according to the definition of the send
method. To arrive at a contradiction assume that the rE.send
call (L. 16.22) blocks indefinitely. As a correct client sends its
(new) request to all execution replicas, eventually fe + 1 cor-
rect execution replicas will per Lemma A.26 have called
rE.send and therefore also rE.move_window(c , tc ) (L. 16.21).
Per IRMC-Liveness III A.19 eventually all agreement replicas
will call rE.move_window(c , tc ). With IRMC-Liveness II A.18
it follows that rE.send returns, which contradicts the as-
sumption. □
Lemma A.28. An agreement replica will eventually try to
receive a new correct request r from a correct client (unless it
has already seen a newer one or skipped it with a checkpoint).
Proof. Lemma A.27 has already shown that all (≥ fe + 1)
correct execution replicas will rE.send the new client re-
quest r which per IRMC-Liveness I A.17 can be received
by a corresponding call on the agreement replicas unless
it is no longer part of the window of the subchannel. Ac-
cording to IRMC-Correctness I A.15 only request r can be
received, as all correct execution replicas send this request.
We therefore have to show that an agreement replica will call
rE.receive(c , t+[c]) (L. 17.15) for the right request counter
value tc .
Assume that t+[c] < tc : As shown above in the proof of
Lemma A.27 all correct agreement replicas will eventually
call rE.move_window(c , tc ), which according to the seman-
tics of the send method will cause it to return ⟨TooOld, tc ⟩
which is used to update t+[c] (L. 17.18) and request tc next.
Assume that t+[c] > tc : We show that this case never
applies. An agreement replica cannot have received a too new
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TooOld message and stored its counter value (L. 17.18): Per
IRMC-Correctness II A.16 at least one execution replica must
have called rE.move_window accordingly, which requires
that a correct execution replica has received a valid request
with counter t+[c] > tc from a correct client. This contradicts
the assumption that the request is new.
Incrementing t+[c] after having received a previous re-
quest (L. 17.22) or processing it in ag.deliver (L. 17.32)
would require a previous request with counter value t ′c ≥ tc ,
which contradicts the assumption. (A faulty client could
cause some chaos here, but this is no problem as the effects
are strictly limited to the client’s subchannel.) □
Remark. These properties effectively make the rE.receive
call self-synchronizing.
Lemma A.29. The agreement black-box will ag.deliver
(L. 17.25) a new request r for sequence number s within bounded
time or apply a checkpoint for a later or equal sequence number.
Proof. After fe + 1 execution replicas complete their call to
rE.send(c , tc , r ) (L. 16.22) an agreement replica can receive
request r and start the agreement process.
Assume that the request r is not delivered within bounded
time and is also not skipped via a checkpoint. The request of
a correct client will eventually arrive at all correct (≥ fe + 1)
execution replicas. With Lemma A.26 and A.27 it follows that
fe + 1 correct execution replicas call rE.send. With IRMC-
Liveness I A.17, IRMC-Correctness I A.15 and Lemma A.28
it follows that all correct agreement replicas will eventually
receive the request r or a ⟨TooOld, t ′c ⟩message if rE.move_-
window (L. 16.21) is called by fe + 1 execution replicas with
t ′c > tc . As a correct client does not issue a request with
counter t ′c > tc before r was executed, all correct execution
replicas will eventually call rE.move_window with exactly
tc , but no higher value, such that receiving TooOld would
violate IRMC-Correctness II A.16. (Executing r as is shown in
the proof of Lemma A.21 would require that it was delivered
before by at least one correct agreement replica.)
Thus, per IRMC-Liveness III A.19 all correct agreement
replicas will eventually internally call move_window(c , tc ) on
the request IRMC and 2fa + 1 correct agreement replicas
eventually receive request r as long as r is not delivered.
With A-Liveness A.7 it follows that fa + 1 correct agreement
replicas eventually deliver r , contradicting the assumption.
Skipping the ag.deliver call via ag.stable_cp (L. 17.42)
requires per CP-Safety A.11 that at least one correct agree-
ment replica created the checkpoint (L. 17.40) and thus the
agreement black-box must already have delivered r . □
Lemma A.30. A request r delivered at sequence number s
that is cE.send by fa + 1 correct agreement replicas will even-
tually either execute on fe + 1 correct execution replicas or
on one correct execution replica once a stable checkpoint with
sequence number sCP ≥ s was created.
Proof. Assume that no stable checkpoint with sequence num-
ber sCP ≥ s is applied at the execution replica (L. 16.42) be-
fore processing r : IRMC-Liveness I A.17 states that fe +1 cor-
rect execution replicas receive some request or a ⟨TooOld, s ′⟩
message (L. 16.26) with s ′ > s as fa+1 agreement replicas sent
the request (L. 17.36). According to IRMC-Correctness I A.15
the request can only be request r as per A-Correctness A.6
all correct agreement replicas send request r . The execution
replicas cannot receive the TooOld message as this would
violate IRMC-Correctness II A.16:
Execution replicas can only call cE.move_window(0, sCP +
1) (L. 16.44) with sCP < s per assumption and thus sCP+1 ≤ s ,
which does not allow TooOld to be returned.
As the agreement black-box delivers requests in sequence
number order according to A-Order A.9, an execution replica
will also be able to receive any other previous request be-
tween sCP and s and therefore will eventually try to receive s .
Agreement replicas call cE.move_window(0, sˆ − |cE,0 | + 1)
(L. 17.45). To create an agreement checkpoint at sˆ (L. 17.40),
the window of the commit subchannel must have included sˆ
(as cE.send (L. 17.36) would have blocked otherwise), that is
max(cE,0.win) ≥ sˆ ⇔ min(cE,0.win) + |cE,0 | − 1 ≥ sˆ ⇔
min(cE,0.win) ≥ sˆ − |cE,0 | + 1. Therefore, an agreement
replica cannot advance the window of the commit IRMC
unless an execution group triggered thewindowmove before.
However, as shown in the previous paragraph the latter
would contradict the assumption. Therefore, fe + 1 correct
execution replicas will eventually execute the request and
possibly create a checkpoint.
Assume that a stable checkpoint with sequence number
sCP ≥ s gets applied: Per CP-Correctness A.11 at least one
correct execution replica must have created the checkpoint
and thus have executed the request as per the previous part
of the proof. Per CP-Liveness A.12 all other correct execution
replicas will eventually receive and apply the checkpoint or
have executed the request. □
Lemma A.31. A correct execution checkpoint at sequence
number sCP for which fa + 1 agreement replicas delivered
and called cE.send(0, sCP ) (L. 17.36) will eventually become
stable (L. 16.42) unless it is superseded by a newer one.
Proof. Assume that no such stable checkpoint exists and that
it is not superseded by a newer one. Then per Lemma A.30
fe + 1 correct execution replicas will execute the request and
thereby create their checkpoint messages (L. 16.40) which
per CP-E-Equivalence A.23 are identical and according to
CP-Liveness II A.13 will become stable. □
Lemma A.32. If no progress occurs, then eventually the start
of the subchannel window of the commit IRMC ismin(cE,0.win)
= sCP +1 with sCP being the latest stable execution checkpoint.
Proof. Per CP-Liveness A.12 eventually all execution replicas
will receive the latest stable execution checkpoint (L. 16.42)
Resilient Cloud-based Replication with Low Latency
and call cE.move_window(0, sCP + 1) (L.16.44). No correct ex-
ecution replica calls cE.move_window for a higher sequence
number as sCP is the number of the latest checkpoint.
Agreement replicas call cE.move_window(0, sˆ − |cE,0 | + 1)
(L. 17.45). To create an agreement checkpoint at sˆ , the win-
dow of the commit subchannel must have included sˆ (as
cE.send (L. 17.36) would have blocked otherwise, prevent-
ing the checkpoint generation), that ismax(cE,0.win) ≥ sˆ ⇔
min(cE,0.win)+ |cE,0 |−1 ≥ sˆ ⇔min(cE,0.win) ≥ sˆ−|cE,0 |+1.
Therefore an agreement replica cannot advance the win-
dow of the commit IRMC to a sequence number that is
larger than that of the execution replicas’ cE.move_window
calls. Thus all correct agreement replicas eventually arrive
atmin(cE,0.win) = sCP + 1 with sCP being the latest stable
execution checkpoint. □
Lemma A.33. Agreement replicas will eventually complete
cE.send(s, r ) (L. 17.36).
Proof. ag.deliver blocks whenwin is full (L. 17.27). AG-WIN
≥ ka andwin is always anchored directly after the sequence
number of the last stable agreement checkpoint. Thuswin
contains at least one sequence number for which a new
agreement checkpoint will be created.
Assume that ag.deliver blocks permanently on the win-
dow check. In that case, per assumption, there can be no
stable agreement checkpoint with sequence number sCP ≥ s
and sCP ∈ win, which would lead to progress. Therefore, as
the client waits for r to be executed, per Lemma A.29 even-
tually fa + 1 agreement replicas also deliver all requests in
win. That is fa + 1 correct agreement replicas create a new
agreement checkpoint, which will become stable and moves
win forward. This contradicts the assumption.
Assume that cE.send (L. 17.36) blocks permanently, which
requires that s > max(cE,0.win). Per A-Order A.9 and CP-A-
Equi-valence A.20 it follows that all previous slots in the sub-
channel window are filled with requests. With Lemma A.29
this applies to at least fa + 1 agreement replicas. As |cE,0 | ≥
ke at least one position in the commit IRMC subchannel
window is an execution checkpoint sequence number. Per
Lemma A.31 this causes a new checkpoint to become sta-
ble, which according to Lemma A.32 eventually moves the
commit IRMC window forward and thus contradicts the
assumption. □
Nowwe can prove that a correct client will eventually receive
a reply to its request:
Proof. Assume that the client does not get a reply. Then
per Lemma A.33 and A.30 fe + 1 correct execution replicas
will eventually have the reply in u[c]. As a correct client
does not send a new request before having obtained a reply
to the last one, u[c] must eventually contain the reply. Per
CP-E-Equivalence A.23 the reply is identical on all correct
execution replicas. At latest after the next request retry the
client will receive the (identical) reply from fe + 1 correct
execution replicas, and therefore accept the reply (L. 15.23),
which contradicts the assumption. □
Remark. An agreement replica will receive a request r either
via the request IRMC, the agreement black-box or skip the
request via a checkpoint.
A.7.8 Multiple Execution Groups. We now generalize
tone ≥ 1 execution groups of which z < ne might be skipped
if these are slow.
Lemma A.34. E-Liveness A.5 also holds for multiple execu-
tion groups.
Proof. Even though an agreement replica only waits for
ne − z groups (L. 17.37) to complete cE.send, an execution
group will only miss requests if the agreement replicas call
cE.move_window (L. 17.45) with a sequence number not yet
received by a slow execution group. As shown in the proof
of Lemma A.32 an agreement replica can only create a check-
point that would push the window of the commit IRMC
forward if the execution group already has created a newer
or matching checkpoint. Generalized to ne execution groups,
the cE.send (L. 17.36) calls for ne − z execution groups have
to complete, before an agreement checkpoint can be cre-
ated (L. 17.40). Therefore an execution group that has fallen
behind can always retrieve an up-to-date checkpoint from
one of the ne − z up-to-date execution groups.
As agreement replicas unconditionally move the com-
mit IRMC window forward (L. 17.45), this will lead to at
least fa + 1 agreement replicas calling cE.move_window (per
Lemma A.33 a corresponding checkpoint will eventually ex-
ist and per CP-Liveness A.12 all correct agreement replicas
will eventually receive it), which per IRMC-Liveness I A.17
and IRMC-Liveness III A.19 will eventually allow execution
groups that fell behind to receive a TooOld message. □
A.7.9 Consistency Guarantees. We now revisit the con-
sistency guarantees provided by Spider.
Write Requests. As previously shown in Section A.7.4,
Spider provides linearizability for write requests.
Read Requests with Strong Consistency. Read requests
with strong consistency work like write requests with one
exception: Only the designated execution group receives the
full request, whereas the other groups only get the client id
c and counter tc . This leads to the following observation:
Lemma A.35. With read requests, the content of checkpoints
can vary between groups in regard to the reply stored in u[c].
That is CP-E-Equivalence A.23 only applies for individual
groups at a time.
Proof. Only the client’s execution group will receive the read
request and modify u[c] accordingly after executing the re-
quest (L. 16.36). All other execution groups store a place-
holder in u[c] which includes the request counter. Therefore,
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the reply parts of u[c] can differ between groups. Note that
this divergence is self-correcting in the sense that it will
disappear after executing the next write request for that
client. □
Remark. This does not prevent the checkpoint from being
transferred between groups, as each group can still generate a
valid proof for its checkpoint. However, the global flow control
could force a group to skip some requests, which might include
group-specific read requests. In that case an execution replica
has to tell the client to resubmit its request if necessary, based
on the placeholder stored in u[c].
Read Requests with Weak Consistency.
Lemma A.36. Weakly consistent read requests provide one-
copy serializability (assuming each request, which can access
various parts of the application state, represents a transaction).
Proof. The reply to the client and state modifications must be
equivalent to those from an acyclic ordering of transactions,
where each transaction is processed atomically [13].
The application state is atomically modified with a totally
ordered sequence of requests (see RSMA.14), which yields an
acyclic order for all state-modifying requests and strongly-
consistent read requests. All weakly consistent read requests
happen between these state modifications, which does not
introduce cycles in the request ordering either.
As a correct client only accepts a reply sent by at least one
correct replica, it will receive a conforming reply. □
A.8 IRMC-RC
The IRMC-RC variant shown in Figure 18 is a simple imple-
mentation of an IRMC that provides the expected properties.
Replicas can aggregateMovemessages before sending them.
In case a sender replica has multiple IRMCs and sends iden-
tical messages on the same subchannel and position, then it
can share a single signed Send message between IRMCs.
Without loss of generality we assume the set of senders RS
and receivers RR to be disjoint, that is RS ∩ RR = . We as-
sume reliable point-to-point channels between replicas, that
is messages sent between individual replicas will be delivered
eventually, unless messages are garbage collected at which
point a replica discards old messages, even when they were
not successfully delivered yet. To keep the pseudo code short,
we assume that messages without correct authentication are
automatically dropped before these can be processed.
All messages are also expected to contain an identifier to
allow differentiation between different IRMCs if necessary.
A.9 IRMC-SC
IRMC-SC shown in Figure 19 and 20 is a more complex but
also more efficient implementation than IRMC-RC.
For liveness, we assume that the Move message is pro-
tected against replay attacks, for example by including a
1 Sender replica rs
2 rwin[r ][sc] := [1, |I RMCsc |] // Received windows, r ∈ RR ∪ rs
3 awin[sc] := [1, |I RMCsc |] // Active window
4 send(Subchannel sc, Position p, Message m):
5 sleep until p ≤ max (awin[sc])
6 if p < min(awin[sc]): return ⟨TooOld,min(awin[sc])⟩
7 else: // p ∈ awin[sc]
8 send siдnrs (⟨Send,m, sc, p ⟩) to RR
9
10 move_window(Subchannel sc, Position p):
11 // The subchannel window start may only increase
12 if p > min(rwin[rs ][sc]):
13 send macrs ,RR (⟨Move, sc, p ⟩) to RR
14 rwin[rs ][sc] := [p, p + |I RMCsc | − 1]
15
16 on receive(m = ⟨Move, sc, p ⟩ from rr ∈ RR):
17 if !valid_macrr ,RS (m): return
18 // Only accept new move messages
19 if p > min(rwin[rr ][sc]):
20 rwin[rr ][sc] := [p, p + |I RMCsc | − 1]
21 // Calculate actual window start
22 w := fr + 1 highest {min(rwin[r ′r ][sc]) | r ′r ∈ RR }
23 awin[sc] := [w, w + |I RMCsc | − 1]
24 garbage−collect messages with SeqNr s < awin[sc]
25
26 Receiver replica rr
27 rwin[r ][sc] = [1, |I RMCsc |] // Received windows, r ∈ RS ∪ rr
28 awin[sc] = [1, |I RMCsc |] // Active window
29 d [sc][p][rs ] =  // Received Send messages
30 receive(Subchannel sc, Position p) −> Message m:
31 sleep until p ≤ max (awin[sc])
32 sleep until either:
33 − case p < min(awin[sc]):
34 return ⟨TooOld,min(awin[sc])⟩
35 − case ∃m : | {rs |rs ∈ RS ,m ∈ d [sc][p][rs ]} | ≥ fs + 1:
36 return m // Receivedm from at least fs + 1 senders
37
38 move_window(Subchannel sc, Position p):
39 // The subchannel window start may only increase
40 if p > min(awin[sc]):
41 send macrr ,RS (⟨Move, sc, p ⟩) to RS
42 awin[sc] := [p, p + |I RMCsc | − 1]
43 garbage−collect messages with SeqNr s < awin[sc]
44
45 on receive(r = ⟨Send,m, sc, p ⟩ from rs ∈ RS):
46 if !valid_siдRS (r): return
47 if p ≥ min(awin[sc]):
48 d [sc][p][rs ] := m
49
50 on receive(m = ⟨Move, sc, p ⟩ from rs ∈ RS):
51 if !valid_macrs ,RR (m): return
52 // Only accept new move messages
53 if p > min(rwin[rs ][sc]):
54 rwin[rs ][sc] := [p, p + |I RMCsc | − 1]
55 nw := fs + 1 highest {min(rwin[r ′s ][sc]) | r ′s ∈ RS }
56 if min(awin[sc]) < nw:
57 move_window(s, nw)
Figure 18. IRMC-RC (pseudo code)
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1 Sender replica rs
2 + Variables from IRMC−RC
3 siд[sc][p][rs ] =  // Certificate share from sender rs for
subchannel sc position p
4 bundle[sc][p] =  // Certificate for subchannel sc position p
5 sender [sc][rr ] = ⊥ // Selected sender for subchannel sc to receiver rr
6 d [sc][p] =  // Message sent in subchannel sc at position p
7 send(Subchannel sc, Position p, Message m):
8 sleep until p ≤ max (awin[sc])
9 if p < min(awin[sc]): return ⟨TooOld,min(awin[sc])⟩
10 else: // p ∈ awin[sc]
11 d [sc][p] := m
12 // SigShare is also processed locally
13 send siдnrs (⟨SigShare, h(m), sc, p ⟩) to RS
14
15 on receive(sд = ⟨SigShare, h(m), sc, p ⟩ from rs ∈ RS):
16 if !valid_siдRS (sд): return
17 if p ≥ min(awin[sc]) ∧ siд[sc][p][rs ] = : // Only accept
first share per sender
18 siд[sc][p][rs ] := sд
19 v := {siд[sc][p][r ] | r ∈ RS , siд[sc][p][r ].h = h(m)}
20 limit v to fs + 1 values
21 // Check if replica has fs+1 matching shares and the actual request
22 if |v | = fs + 1 ∧ d [sc][p] ,  ∧ bundle[sc][p] = :
23 bundle[sc][p] :=
macrs ,RR (⟨Certificate, d [sc][p], sc, p, v ⟩)
24 send bundle[sc][p] to receivers r where
sender [sc][r ] = rs
25
26 periodic:
27 // Send position of latest certificate per subchannel with no gaps at
previous positions in the subchannel window
28 for each subchannel sc:
29 proд[sc] := highest p ∈ awin[sc] with
∀p′ ∈ awin[sc], p′ ≤ p : bundle[sc][p′] , 
30 send macrs ,RR (⟨Progress, proд ⟩) to RR
31
32 // move_window and receive(Move) are identical to IRMC−RC
33
34 // Select sender for subchannel
35 on receive(m = ⟨Select, sc, s ⟩ from rr ∈ RR):
36 if !valid_macrr ,RS (m): return
37 sender [sc][rr ] := s
38 // Send queued messages for subchannel sc to rr
39 ∀p : send bundle[sc][p] to receiver rr if s = rs
Figure 19. IRMC-SC sender endpoint (pseudo code)
1 Receiver replica rr
2 + Variables from IRMC−RC
3 d [sc][p] =  // Message received for subchannel sc at position p
4 pe[r ][sc] := 0 // Individual expected progress reported by r ∈ RS
5 pm[sc] := 0 // Merged progress values (fs + 1 highest)
6 receive(Subchannel sc, Position p) −> Message m:
7 sleep until p ≤ max (awin[sc])
8 sleep until either:
9 − case p < min(awin[sc]):
10 return ⟨TooOld,min(awin[sc])⟩
11 − case d[sc][p] , :
12 return d [sc][p]
13
14 on receive(r = ⟨Certificate,m, sc, p, v ⟩ from rs ∈ RS):
15 if !valid_macrs ,RR (r): return
16 // Certificate must contain fs + 1 matching signatures from different
sender endpoints
17 if p ≥ min(awin[sc]) ∧ |v | = fs + 1 ∧ ∀sд ∈ v :
valid_siдRS (sд form) ∧ sд from different senders:
18 d [sc][p] := m
19
20 on receive(m = ⟨Progress, np ⟩ from rs ∈ RS):
21 if !valid_macrs ,RR (m): return
22 // Merge progress vectors
23 for each subchannel sc:
24 pe[rs ][sc] := max (pe[rs ][sc], np[sc])
25 pm[sc] := fs + 1 highest {pe[r ′][sc] | r ′ ∈ RS }
26 // Start timeout if some messages are still missing
27 if ∃s′ ∈ [min(awin[sc]), pm[sc]] : d [sc][s′] = :
28 start timer for sc@pm[sc], if not started yet
29
30 on timeout for sc@pm[sc]:
31 // Timeout expired and there are still missing certificates
32 if ∃s′ ∈ [min(awin[sc]), pm[sc]] : d [sc][s′] = :
33 select new sender rs for sc
34 send macrr ,RS (⟨Select, sc, rs ⟩) to RS
35 restart timer for sc@pm[sc]
36
37 // move_window and receive(Move) are identical to IRMC−RC
Figure 20. IRMC-SC receiver endpoint (pseudo code)
counter to filter out already processed instances of the mes-
sage to ensure that these are not processed multiple times. In
case a sender replica has multiple IRMCs and sends identical
messages on the same subchannel and position, then it can
share a single signed Certificate message between IRMCs.
